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I. INTRODUCTION
The law of automobile product liability in the United States developed
initially through a process of evolution, as evidenced by the more than four
decades between the leading decisions of McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,1 and
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.2 Since Henningsen, the restrained
evolution of judicial development has become a revolution with its major focus
of attack in several significant areas, including: (1) crashworthiness; (2) strict
liability in tort;' (3) burden of proof to establish the existence of a "defect"; 5
and (4) apportionment of liability judgments, i.e., comparative fault versus
joint and several liability.
The conflux of developments in these areas has resulted in a legal quag-
mire for the automotive industry and has enabled virtually any person injured
in an automobile collision to bring suit with the assurance that the ultimate
issues will be determined by a jury. As submitted by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, the manufacturer of a product has become the "guarantor" of
that product's safety.7 If a line can be drawn between "guarantor" and "in-
1. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). "The development of product liability concepts over the
past fifteen years has followed the observation of Justice Frankfurter that '[blecause of the mo-
mentum of adjudication . . . [a] doctrine expands from case to case ... '
Delk v. Holiday Inns, Inc., No. 81-624, 5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 1982) (order granting directed
verdict) (citing Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 374 (1958).
3. The foundation case, Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), was
followed in over 20 jurisdictions by 1977. See Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ii. 2d 51, 61-62, 374 N.E.2d
460, 465 (1978). Additional jurisdictions have adopted the doctrine as the opportunity was
presented. E.g., Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568
(1981); Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied. 454 U.S. 867
(1981).
4. See infra notes 24-49 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 50-118 and accompanying text.
6. Approximately 37 states have adopted some form of comparative negligence or compara-
tive fault. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGUGENCE, § 1.1 (1974 & Supp. 1981). Most
have done so through legislation. See. e.g., LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West 1972) (amended
1979). Others have accomplished the result through decisional law. E.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13
Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla.
1973); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); Bradley v.
Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979); Scott v. Rizzo, No. 13,235 (N. Mex.
Sup. Ct. Feb. 12, 1981). Comparative fault issues will be more fully discussed at infra notes 119-
94 and accompanying text.
7. In Azzarello v. Black Bros. Constr. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978), the court
approved a jury instruction stating: "The [supplier] of a product is the guarantor of its safety. The
product must, therefore, be provided with every element necessary to make it safe for [its in-
tended] use." Id. at 559 n.12, 391 A.2d at 1027 n.12.
8. Guarantor is defined as "[h]e who makes a guaranty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 634
(rev. 5th ed. 1979). Guaranty is defined as "[t]o undertake collaterally to answer for the payment
of another's debt, or the performance of another's duty, liability or obligation; to assume the
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surer",' that line is barely discernible in automotive and other product liability
litigation. The purpose of this Article is twofold: first, to trace and commernt
upon these areas of legal development and revolution; and second, to suggest
an effective legislative program which would protect the legitimate needs of
the consumer while providing adequate and necessary support to an industry
recognized as a major component of the American economy.
1I. JUDICIAL EVOLUTION OF AUTOMOBILE PRODUCT LIABILITY
A. Crashworthiness
The concept of automotive crashworthiness was almost uniformly rejected
as recently as the early 1970's. The leading case rejecting the doctrine was
Evans v. General Motors, Corp.,1' decided by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. In 1971 this author, with Michael Hoenig, detailed the policy consid-
erations in support of continued rejection of the crashworthiness doctrine and
found that the Evans decision reflected the majority position." Two years af-
ter Evans, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the doctrine of
crashworthiness in Larsen v. General Motors, Corp." The Larsen court, utiliz-
ing only negligence principles, found
no rational basis exists for limiting recovery to situations where the
defect in design or manufacture was the causative factor of the
accident, as the accident and the resulting injury, usually caused
by the so-called "second collision" of the passenger with the inte-
rior part of the automobile, all are foreseeable. Where the injuries
or enhanced injuries are due to the manufacturer's failure to use
reasonable care to avoid subjecting the user of its products to an
unreasonable risk of injury, general negligence principles should be
applicable."8
Larsen was greeted with immediate approval by commentators who ap-
preciated the apparent step taken to protect the consumer." ' These commenta-
responsibility of a guarantor, to warrant." Id. (emphasis added).
9. Insurer is defined as "[t]he underwriting or insurance company with whom a contract of
insurance is made." Id. at 726. One of several definitions of insurance is "[a] contract whereby
one undertakes to indemnify another against loss, damage or liability arising from an unknown
or contingent event." Id. at 721 (emphasis added). Although the difference may be significant in
terms of the applicability of the Statute of Frauds and required distinctions between guarantor
and surety, or between guarantor and insurer, A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 384, 388
(1950), the differences are without legal significance in the context of many automotive product
liability issues.
10. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836, overruled by Huff v. White
Motor Co., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
11. Hoenig & Werber, Automobile "Crashworthiness"." An Untenable Doctrine, 20 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 578 (1971).
12. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
13. Id. at 502.
14. Comment, Automobile Manufacturers-A New Liability for Design Defects, 49 B. U. L.
REV. 167 (1969); Comment, Automobile Design Liability: Larsen v. General Motors and Its Af-
termath, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 299 (1969); Note, "'Intended Use" and the Unsafe Automobile:
Manufacturers' Liability for Negligent Design, 28 MD. L. REV. 386 (1968); Commentary, Prod-
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tors were either convinced that the industry possessed the ability to accept and
pass on to the consumer the costs of such litigation or simply assumed such a
capacity existed. Larsen and its adherents have won the day. Virtually every
court which has ruled on the issue of automotive crashworthiness during the
past decade has permitted the questions raised to reach the trier of fact. More-
over, these decisions are no longer predicated on the relatively clear principles
of negligence theory, but are also premised upon traditional breach of war-
ranty1 5 and strict liability in tort concepts."' The crashworthiness doctrine has
been given a broader legal base than could ever have been anticipated by the
court which first promulgated it.
A recent decision accepting the doctrine, Leichtamer v. American Motors
Corp.,'7 is significant in that it extends heretofore established boundaries. The
opinion not only adopts the crashworthiness strict liability concept, but within
this framework also asserts broad principles relating to the nature of the
proofs permissible, expands the permissible use of advertising in support of a
claim, and extends the availability of punitive damages. Although concep-
tually premised on Larsen, the decision in Leichtamer extends Larsen beyond
its originally intended scope or purpose. The abuses of the rules of evidence
and the principles established in Leichtamer should be limited to the narrow
factual circumstances under which that case arose."
Automotive crashworthiness cases can readily become examples of de
facto insurer liability through judicial determination. Such a result is pre-
ordained if the courts apply the concepts expressed in Azzarello v. Black Bros.
Co.,' 9 and the concurring opinion of Judge Campbell in Turner v. General
ucts Liability-Automobile Design-Manufacturer's Duty of Reasonable Care Requires Vehicle
Design Which Will Not Excerbate Collision Injuries, 21 ALA. L. REV. 141 (1968).
15. E.g., Back v. Wickes Corp., 376 Mass. 633, 378 N.E.2d 964 (1978); Elasser v. American
Motors Corp., 81 Mich. App. 379, 265 N.W.2d 339 (1978).
16. E.g., Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Roberts v. May, 41 Colo.
App. 82, 583 P.2d 305 (1978); Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 374 N.E.2d 460 (1978);
Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A. Inc., 126 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973).
In second collision cases Florida now permits a plaintiff to proceed under theories of negli-
gence or strict liability or both. Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, [1980-1981 Tranfer Binder] PRoD. LIAB.
REP. (CCH) V 9026 (Fla. Sup. Ct., July 23, 1981). The court observed the need for improvements
in the standard jury instructions relating to the distinction between design and manufacturing
defects. Id. at 20,864 n.4. The court failed, however, to note the potential for inconsistent jury
verdicts. See infra note 49.
17. 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981). See also Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Seese,
454 U.S. 867 (1981).
18. Such a possibility, however, is unlikely in view of the recent decision in Knitz v. Minster
Mach. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814 (1982). Although not a crashworthiness case, the
opinion approves, follows and appears to expand Leichtamer. The court dispensed with any re-
quirement that to impose strict liability in tort, a defect be unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 466,
432 N.E.2d at 818.
19. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978). It has been observed that "were it not so unaccept-
able and 'unprincipled,' the decision . . . would quickly force dismissal of many of the problems
[of defect definition and burden of proof] raised in this discussion." Birnbaum, Unmasking the
Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33
VAND. L. RaV. 593, 636 (1980).
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Motors Corp. 0 These decisions appear to take the position that a product is
defective if it lacks any element necessary to make it safe or possesses any
element which makes it unsafe." Although the opinion decries insurer liabil-
ity, the Azzarello approach leads directly to the question posed by Professor
Wade's analysis of these cases: "What is the distinction between an insurer
and a guarantor?" 2 2 Moreover:
How, one may ask, could any automobile today turn out not to
be actionable under these tests? In a collision an automobile may
possibly catch fire-no matter where the gas tank is located or how
it is protected. Should we require every car to have an automatic
sprinkling system, regardless of how that might affect its gasoline
mileage? A governor limiting the speed to ten miles per hour would
make it much safer-but probably not safe enough. Clearly, safety
must be a relative matter. .. .
Unless the courts take appropriate steps in accordance with proper judicial
restraint, the questions posed will always be answered in favor of liability.
Safety will become an unattainable absolute premise for imposition of insurer
liability.
B. Strict Liability in Tort
The legal premises and policies of strict liability in tort are an outgrowth
of commercial law principles of warranty.' This doctrine evolved from a de-
sire to place liability upon the party whom the courts believed to be primarily
responsible for the injury which occurred.' 5 It did so by freeing warranty the-
ory from the strictures of the statute of limitations, notice and privity. 6 As a
20. 584 S.W.2d 844, 853-55 (Tex. 1979) (Campbell, J., concurring).
21. The case of Bailey v. Boatland of Houston, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)
goes one step further. In Bailey, the court held that evidence could not be introduced to show that
a proffered design alternative (a "kill" switch) was unavailable at the time of manufacture and
could not have been incorporated as a safety device. Id. at 812.
22. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability 33 VAND. L. REV. 551,
567 n.81 (1980).
23. Id. at 568.
24. LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373, 375-76 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Stromsodt v. Parke-
Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D.N.D. 1966), affid, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969); Greeno
v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass.
633, 639, 378 N.E.2d 964, 966 (1978); Fisher v. Gate City Steel Corp., 190 Neb. 699, 703, 211
N.W.2d 914, 917 (1973); Manieri v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 151 N.J. Super. 425, 429-30, 376
A.2d 1317, 1321 (1977).
25. As stated in Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568
(1981):
The doctrine of strict liability evolved to place liability on the party primarily re-
sponsible for the injury occurring, that is, the manufacturer of the product. Any
distinction based upon the source of the defect undermines the policy underlying the
doctrine that the public interest in human life and safety can best be protected by
subjecting manufacturers of defective products to strict liability in tort when the
products cause harm.
Id. at 464-65, 424 N.E.2d at 575 (citations omitted).
26. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
1982)
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result, courts were able to relieve plaintiffs of the assertedly onerous burden of
proof problems presented in traditional negligence actions. 7
Strict liability approaches in the product field are traceable to the concur-
ring opinion of Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of
Fresno.2 8 Judicial acceptance of the doctrine took place in the short span of
approximately one decade after its initial promulgation in the seminal Califor-
nia Supreme Court decision, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc." By the
mid-1970's a majority of states had adopted strict liability in tort; today al-
most all jurisdictions have adopted some version of the doctrine." The speed
of acceptance was truly revolutionary.31
A major impetus to acceptance of the doctrine came with adoption of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A,"2 which survived a difficult and
checkered history." Several drafters of section 402A had serious reservations
as to whether it could properly be applied to design litigation cases. The Re-
porter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Dean Prosser, observed that
there are
two particular areas in which the liability of the manufacturer,
even though it may occasionally be called strict, appears to rest
primarily upon a departure from proper standards of care, so that
the tort is essentially a matter of negligence.
One of these involves the design of the product, which includes
plan, structure, choice of materials, and specifications.3 4
Commentators, such as Professor Henderson, have recognized the com-
plexities inherent in design defect litigation. This recognition led Professor
(1963); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975); Lonzrick v. Re-
public Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966). See generally PROD. LIAB. REP.
(CCH) 1 1210, at 1135 (May, 1980) (privity); Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130,
238 A.2d 169 (1968) (statute of limitations and privity); Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975) (statute of limitations); Holifield v.
Setco Indus., Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969) (statute of limitations). See also
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (strict liability to the consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
27. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 (Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull Eng'g
Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978); Phipps v. General
Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 353, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976).
28. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
29. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
30. PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 1 4015, at 4018 (May 1982); W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J.
MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY 195 n.1 (1980).
31. W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, supra note 30, at 195-96, stated: "Indeed,
the general adoption of the doctrine in this country from 1963 to the mid-1970's is one of the most
rapid and dramatic doctrinal developments ever to occur in the law of torts." Professor Wade
observed, "The combination of Greenman and 402A provided the impetus for converting evolu-
tionary change into revolutionary change." Wade, supra note 22, at 555.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See infra note 39.
33. The history is briefly summarized by Judge Wisdom in Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co.,
338 F.2d 911, 918-19 (5th Cir. 1964), and is discussed at greater length in Hoenig, Product
Designs And Strict Tort Liability: Is There A Better Approach? 8 Sw. U. L. REV. 109, 112
(1976).
34. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 644-45 (4th ed. 1971).
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Henderson to assert a significant warning as early as 1973.*3 In 1976, this
warning was reiterated in an article which reconfirmed the polycentric nature
of design defect litigation and concluded that such issues exceed the capacity
of the judicial system. s6 Responding to criticisms advanced by others,"7 Profes-
sor Henderson stated:
What began as an attempt to address the question of whether
this particular means (adjudication) is suited to achieving the ends
of increased product safety has, once again, been subtly trans-
formed into an assertion that the ends justify the means. . . .To
such an assertion I am forced to reply that it begs the very question
sought to be answered. Even if it were true that the court could
weigh the various factors differently, the fact remains that the
problem of weighing the various factors would retain its full mea-
sure of polycentricity. 8
Utilization of strict liability principles in design defect litigation increases the
complexity of the issues.
From its inception, design defect litigation, and its special application in
crashworthiness litigation, was beyond the pale of section 402A. The Ameri-
can Law Institute, when adopting section 402A, could not have considered
fully the crashworthiness principles to which strict liability concepts are not
applied since they had not yet been approved by any American jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, section 402A, which provides for liability for physical harm
caused by the selling of a product in a "defective condition unreasonably dan-
35. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of
Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973). Even the California courts have recognized the
problems inherent in defining and applying the term "defect" to design choice litigation. In Barker
v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 453-54, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 235-36 (1978),
the court stated that "the concept of defect raises considerably more difficulties in the design
defect context than it does in the manufacturing or production defect context." A series of prior
appellate level decisions cited in Barker illustrate how thoughtful appellate courts "wrestled with
the problem of devising a comprehensive definition of design defect ... ." Id. at 429, 573 P.2d at
453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235 (citing Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132
Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976); Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1976);
Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974)).
36. Henderson, Design Defect Litigation Revisited, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 541 (1976).
37. Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use And Abuse Of Warnings In Products
Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes Of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495 (1976).
38. Henderson, supra note 36, at 549. At least one court has concurred in the belief that
"trial courts are inappropriate for the task in the area of product design choices," and such stan-
dards should be extrajudicially established. Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App. 74, 80,
268 N.W.2d 291, 294 (1978). The court, however, was required to rule and in so doing imposed a
realistic burden of proof standard upon the plaintiff who had to establish either:
(1) That the particular design was not in conformity with industry design stan-
dards, design guidelines established by an authoritative voluntary association, or de-
sign criteria set by legislative or other governmental regulation; or
(2) That the design choice of the manufacturer carries with it a latent risk of
injury and the manufacturer has not adequately communicated the nature of that
risk to potential users . . ..
Id. at 81, 268 N.W.2d at 295 (emphasis in original).
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gerous to the user or consumer," has been and remains the pre-eminent state-
ment of the doctrine.8 9 Unlike many judicial developments wherein a concept
can properly be applied to a subsequently recognized purpose, the current in-
discriminate utilization of strict liability principles to both design defect and
crashworthiness cases is a misuse of the doctrine.
Despite the availability of section 402A and its sanctification by numer-
ous courts, other courts have exhibited considerable difficulty in adopting and
applying a clear statement of the doctrine. For several years the New York
Court of Appeals rejected any form of strict liability on the premise that its
consumers already were protected adequately under warranty law.40 Not until
1973 did this court yield to the tide of strict liability41 and ultimately discuss
the doctrine in a crashworthiness action.42 In Ohio, initial approval of strict
liability principles occurred in 1966 when the Ohio Supreme Court adopted
the concept of strict liability in warranty.43 This concept extended warranty
protection to those consumers lacking privity of contract with the manufac-
turer. More than a decade later that court finally adopted section 402A," but
neither version was applied to a crashworthiness section until 1981 .45 Even
California, the state from which national acceptance commenced, evinces a
checkered history in determining the parameters of strict liability.46 Califor-
nia's most recent version rejects the Restatement approach to permit a more
limited burden of proof upon the plaintiff.4 7 Regardless of how the courts have
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
40. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d
592 (1963).
41. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
42. In Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 41 A.D.2d 54, 341 N.Y.S.2d 846, afid, 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305
N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973), the court of appeals upheld a complaint sounding in negli-
gence, warranty and strict liability. However, the crashworthiness theory was limited to negligence
and breach of warranty with reference only to strict liability and the Codling case as support. Id.
at 158-59, 305 N.E.2d at 773-74, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 650-51.
43. Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
44. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
45. Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981). An
earlier appellate decision embraced the negligence crashworthiness theory. Burkhard v. Short, 28
Ohio App. 2d 141, 275 N.E.2d 632 (1971).
46. Compare Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972) (strict liability not imposed if injury unforeseeable), with Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal.
3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) (manufacturer strictly liable for injuries result-
ing from product defective in design).
47. The allocation of such burden is particularly significant in this context inasmuch
[Vol. 18:!
1982] PRODUCTS LIABILITY REVOLUTION
struggled with this doctrine, their collective judgment has been rendered. In a
period of less than twenty years strict liability has become an integral part of
American common law and has inspired an acute increase in product liability
litigation. The doctrine is being applied increasingly to crashworthiness ac-
tions.48 It is not necessary to return to the days of yesteryear nor to reject all
design defect litigation49 in order to preclude the excesses of strict liability. All
that is needed is that the revolution which began in 1963 be restrained
through proper legislative programs. A uniform legislative approach can make
necessary modifications and restore a proper balance to design defect litigation
generally and to automotive crashworthiness specifically.
III. BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE MEANING OF "DEFECT"
The appropriate burden of proof to be imposed upon a plaintiff in a prod-
uct liability action is inextricably intertwined with the term "defect." Unless
"defect" can be defined, it is impossible to realistically allocate the burden of
proof. The concept of "design defect" is even more difficult to define and place
in a proper burden-of-proof perspective. The broader and more liberal the defi-
nition of defects the less rigid and demanding the plaintiff's burden of proof.
In their efforts to compensate for all injury, some courts have defined and
redefined the meaning of defect to permit the eradiciation of a meaningful
burden of proof obligation for injured parties.
The statement that "courts continue to flounder""0 while attempting to
as this court's product liability decisions have repeatedly emphasized that one
of the principal purposes behind the strict product liability doctrine is to relieve an
injured plaintiff of many of the onerous evidentiary burdens inherent in a negligence
cause of action. . . .[W]e conclude that once the plaintiff makes a prima facie
showing that the injury was proximately caused by the product's design, the burden
should appropriately shift to the defendant to prove ... that the product is not
defective.
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. This decision
is discussed more fully at infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
48. See cases cited supra note 16. See also Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Volkswagen of Am.,
II Wash. App. 929, 525 P.2d 286 (1974); Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 560 (1972).
49. At the very least, strict liability concepts must not be applied in design defect litigation.
See infra note 51 and accompanying text. An excellent example of the confusion engendered by
the Restatement definition of "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" is Fisher v. Cleveland
Punch & Shear Works Co., 91 Wis. 2d 85, 280 N.W.2d 280 (1979). The court upheld a jury
verdict of no liability under section 402A while affirming a verdict for the plaintiff on a theory of
negligent design. The court was apparently unimpressed by the fact that a product found not to be
defective could somehow have been negligently designed. Id. at 99, 280 N.W.2d at 286. It has
been suggested that the jury misapprehended the meaning of the term "defect" while the court
misapprehended the meaning of "unreasonably dangerous." Wade, supra note 22, at 564.
Similarly paradoxical results are found in Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 19 Cal. 3d 530, 564
P.2d 857, 138 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1977) and Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 603, 235 N.W.2d
677, 685-86 (1975) (concurring opinion subsequently elevated to majority status). Cf. Halvorson
v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 307 Minn. 48, 240 N.W.2d 303 (1976) (inconsistent findings
of no strict liability but 25% negligence); Mather v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 23 Ariz. App. 409,
533 P.2d 717 (1975) (negligence count withdrawn from jury when strict liability count present as
negligence count considered superfluous and confusing).
50. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 490, 525 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1974).
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determine whether a product is defective remains true. It is increasingly evi-
dent that "defective design is an amphorus [sic] and elusive concept.""1 Nu-
merous commentators have addressed the problem 2 without providing a uni-
form judicially acceptable solution. The complexities are so great that a new
defense has been suggested which imaginatively seeks the return of some neg-
ligence principles within a "process defense.""3 If accepted, this approach
would partially avoid the need for resolving the definitional morass. Although
the use of negligence principles as the proper means to resolve product liability
actions is not new," the suggested defense is premised upon an entirely new
perspective.
It is no longer a fruitful task to add to the literature seeking to properly
define defect. Arguments in favor of returning to a negligence standard have
been presented clearly and require no lengthy reiteration. Various cases
demonstrate the wisdom of those who advocate a strategic withdrawal from
the presently strained forward lines of strict liability, design and crashworthi-
ness doctrines.
Strong new voices have joined recently in urging that negligence princi-
ples be utilized to resolve design defect litigation. 55 The primary author of the
51. Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578 (1974).
Contrary to the expectation expressed in this opinion, courts have been unable to summarily dis-
pose of extravagant claims of defective design. This failure continues to permit the courts to be
drowned in a sea of unmeritorious demands for payment of the wages of recklessness and folly
while seeking the benefit of protection against injury.
52. Since 1975 there have been numerous major contributions including, but not limited to,
Birnbaum, supra note 19; Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56
N.C. L. REV. 643 (1978); Henderson, supra note 36; Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy
Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L.
REV. 773 (1979); Hoenig, supra note 33; Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the
Meaning of Defect, 10 CuM. L. REV. 293 (1979); Phillips, The Standard For Determining Defec-
tiveness In Products Liability, 46 U. CINN. L. REV. 101 (1977); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher &
Piehler, supra note 37; Wade, supra note 22; Walkowiak, Product Liability Litigation And The
Concept Of Defective Goods: "Reasonableness" Revisited?, 44 AIR L. & CoM. 705 (1979).
53. Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability:
From Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 347, 379 (1980).
54. Hoenig, supra note 33, at 134-36. In 1973, Professor Wade suggested that design cases
be "handled under the negligence techniques." Wade, On The Nature Of Strict Tort Liability For
Products. 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837 (1973). Professor Prosser has observed:
The proof of strict liability for a defective product does not appear to differ in
any significant respect from the proof of negligence. In a negligence case the plain-
tiff has the initial burden of establishing three things. The first is that he has been
injured by the product. . . .The second is that the injury occurred because the
product was defective, and this also is no less true of strict liability. . . .The third
is that the defect existed when the product left the hands of the defendant; and this
again is no less true of strict liability.
Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 50-51 (1966). See
also W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 96.
55. See generally Birnbaum, supra note 19; Schwartz, The Uniform Product Liability
Act-A Brief Overview, 33 VAND. L. REV. 579 (1980). See also Wade, supra note 22, at 552,
570, where he reiterated his view that design defect litigation requires a negligence/risk-analysis
standard premised upon whether a product is unreasonably dangerous or, more clearly, "not rea-
sonably safe."
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Uniform Model Product Liability Act (Act), Professor Victor Schwartz, ob-
served that the Act "balances risk against utility and does not rely on hind-
sight.""' This utlization of a fault standard is required because:
Strict liability cannot be justified, however, for either design
defects that are predicated on a failure to warn or instruct. Such
claims should be based on a practical fault standard. Some courts
have attempted to apply strict liability in these areas. They have
sought to justify the result under a theory of "risk distribution"
... . The problem with this approach is that the "risk distribu-
tion" rationale provides no stopping point short of absolute liability
57
Utilization of a more lenient definition of defect, an eased burden of proof
upon claimants and restrictions on the admissibility of evidence proffered by
defendants are neither necessary nor proper. The development of such stan-
dards by some courts raises the "spectre of absolute liability." 58 Design defect
litigation, crashworthiness litigation and related products design cases are too
polycentric for proper resolution under current principles. A return to negli-
gence principles would restore proper fault concepts to their rightful position
as the foundation of liability while simplifying the judicial and jury tasks.
Such a return, coupled with the utilization of comparative fault,8 ' would result
in a just and fair recovery for defect-caused injury.
The various judicial and other approaches to defining defect are numer-
ous, especially if each sophistication is considered, i.e., where risk analysis is
set forth in multiple varieties with slightly different emphasis on similar fac-
tors.60 Nevertheless, defect definitions can be categorized. The case of Cater-
56. Schwartz, supra note 55, at 586.
57. Id. at 585.
58. Birnbaum, supra note 19, at 648. Birnbaum concluded:
Liability for conscious design defects is tortious liability, and the time has come
for courts to stop creating obfuscatory tests that can only confuse jurors and deny
litigants a consistently fair and just result. Imposing a negligence standard for de-
sign defect liability is in many cases only to define in a coherent fashion what liti-
gants are in fact arguing and what jurors are in essence analyzing. When this is not
the case, it should in all fairness be the case. The confused and inconsistent body of
product liability case law that has emerged in the last fifteen years seriously under-
mines the integrity of the tort system. As a constructive response, it is time for
courts to adopt, unequivocally and forthrightly, a pure negligence/risk-utility test in
design defect cases.
Id. at 649.
59. See infra notes 119-44 and accompanying text.
60. See generally Calabresi, Product Liability: Curse Or Bulwark Of Free Enterprise, 27
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 313 (1978); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Green, Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessment and the Law: Introduc-
tion and Perspective, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 901 (1977); Hubbard, Efficiency, Expectation and
Justice: A Jurisprudential Analysis of the Concept of Unreasonably Dangerous Product Defect,
28 S. CAL. L. REV. 587 (1977); Tribe, Technology Assessment And The Fourth Discontinuity:
The Limits Of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1973). More specifically, see
Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Wade, supra
note 54.
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pillar Tractor Co. v. Beck61 served such a purpose. Before attempting to cate-
gorize the available definitional standards the court expressed its underlying
philosophy:
[miost authorities appear to agree that manufacturers are not ab-
solute insurers of their products. Strict liability will not impose le-
gal responsibility simply because a product causes harm. A product
must be defective as marketed if liability is to attach, and "defec-
tive" must mean something more than a condition causing physical
injury."
The definition of defect and burden of proof standards adopted by the
court illustrate just how infinitesimal that "something" can be. Nothing must
be established by the plaintiff beyond the fact that the injury was proximately
caused by the product due to a condition which existed at the time of manu-
facture. Such a result is at odds with the stated policy of the court.
Five primary tests of defect were described by the Beck court.0 3 These
are: (1) deviation from the norm; (2) reasonable fitness for intended use; (3)
Restatement (Second) Torts, section 402A; (4) risk/utility analysis; and (5)
the Barker approach."
Deviation from the norm is premised on evidence that the product does
not match the quality of similar products. This is a basic test often utilized to
meet the burden of proof in a negligence action. The Beck court rejected this
approach primarily because of its belief that an entire product line can be
defective and because the burden of proof is placed upon the plaintiff. 5 By its
rejection of this definition for all cases, the Beck court ignored the fact that
this lucid approach often results in the imposition of liability and was not in-
tended for use in conscious design choice litigation. Indeed, advanced design
concepts would be deterred if this test were used outside the area of compo-
nent failure. A new design could have no basis for comparison and could
thereby be found to be outside the norm simply because no norm existed.
Reasonable fitness for intended use is developed from the law of warranty
and commercial expectation. This approach stressed consumer expectancy,
thereby making recovery more likely for latent than for patent defects. More-
over, the Beck court believed that this standard would shield the manufacturer
whenever consumer expectancy was too low.6 Again, the court properly ob-
served the difficulties of the doctrine without recognition that in proper cases
this can be an effective tool for the imposition of liability. Since it is premised
on reasonable consumer expectancy, the reasonableness element of negligence
law is inherent in this standard. The real cause of rejection may well be this
negligence overtone.
61. 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979). This case is also unique as it appears to be the only opinion
since Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978), which
has fully accepted the strained Barker approach. A partial acceptance is found in Knitz v. Min-
ster Mach. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E. 2d 814 (1982).
62. 592 P.2d at 879 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 880.
64. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
65. 593 P.2d at 881-82.
66. Id. at 882.
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Section 402A requires that a product be "unreasonably dangerous" and
in a condition not contemplated by the consumer,07 thereby barring recovery
for obvious or generally known dangers. Such a result was believed by the
Beck court to unduly limit the scope of liability and to unduly increase the
plaintiffs burden of proof." It can also be argued that this doctrine often
incorporated the unacceptable consumer expectancy standard. Again the Beck
court rejected a definition utilized by a substantial number of jurisdictions. 69
Contrary to the belief of the court, this approach reduces the burden of proof
which would have been imposed under a negligence standard.
A risk/utility analysis recognizes the variety of factors relevant to product
defect litigation and calls for a balancing of these factors. Proper jury instruc-
tions defining risk/utility analysis, however, require a balancing and conse-
quent intrusion of negligence terminology." This definition is rejected despite
the fact that it is one of the few approaches which can instruct the jury in
design defect matters. It is the only available standard, other than negligence,
which permits a defendant to document all of the factors which went into its
conscious design choice decision. Liability for an intended unsafe design
choice, as well as for an inadvertent final design error, can be imposed through
proper risk/utility analysis. A design choice made strictly for economic rea-
sons, however, would be most difficult for a manufacturer to defend.
Permeating each of the four recognized definitions is the role of negli-
gence principles. This substantiates the fact that negligence principles must be
retained in product defect litigation. Nevertheless, the Beck court adopted the
fifth approach and thus added its weight to an ill-conceived standard ap-
proaching, if not attaining, absolute insurer liability.
The Barker 7 approach adopts alternative methods of defect definition
and burden of proof requirements. An injured party under this doctrine can
either: (1) establish that the product did not perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner; or (2) prove that the product's design proximately caused the injury,
at which time the burden of proof is shifted to the defendant to establish that
the design benefits outweigh the risk of danger.7 2
The first alternative is a viable one which contains many of the elements
and benefits of the previous four definitions. The second alternative presents a
situation in which the court makes it possible for every product case to reach
the jury"3 as it merely requires a causal relationship between the product and
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See also supra note 39.
68. 593 P.2d at 882-83.
69. The Restatement definition has been adopted by a majority of jurisdictions. See generally
PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4015 (May 1982).
70. 593 P.2d at 883.
71. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
72. 593 P.2d at 884, citing Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58,
143 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
73. Wade, supra note 22, recognized this:
The true significance of the Barker rule on the burden of proof is its effect in deter-
mining when a design case goes to the jury. Barker declares that the requirement
for a "prima facie showing [is] that the injury was proximately caused by the prod-
uct's design." If this is enough to take the case to the jury, the role of the judge will
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the injury. The Barker-Beck test is an admission that the term "defect" is not
truly definable. The resulting standard is an assertion that the definition of
defect can be created from a bolt of cloth without using a cutting pattern. 4
The second alternative is applicable only when ordinary consumer expec-
tations are not met. It is to be used only when the design exposes the user to
"excessive preventable danger. '7 5 A jury issue remains after a finding that the
ordinary consumer would not find the product defective. Thus another formi-
dable army is sent into the battle against an already weakened defendant.
The early shift in the burden of proof is designed to require that the man-
ufacturer, allegedly the party with greater ability to present proof on technical
and complex issues, prove a negative, i.e., that the product was not defective.
Proof of a negative is generally more difficult than proof of an affirmative.
Excessiveness of preventable danger is to be measured by the benefits of the
design against the inherent risk of danger in that design. It is unlikely that a
jury, when faced with a serious injury, would find that the benefits of design
outweighed the inherent risk when the burden is solely upon the defendant.
This determination is to be made with not only the benefit of hindsight, but
with the "victim" before the court. Under such an approach no jury can
readily find against a severely injured plaintiff and in favor of a large corpora-
tion. Moreover, the premise that the manufacturer is best able to produce the
evidence in regard to technical matters is no longer valid. There exists a pleth-
ora of expert witnesses who can be called upon by counsel. Liberal discovery
rules permit counsel for an injured party to learn virtually anything and every-
thing that his defense counterpart can learn. 76
The early shift in the burden of proof contains within it still another un-
fair blow to the defendant. In these cases, plaintiffs will be able to submit to
juries concise and simple cases which can emphasize the degree of injury. De-
fendants, however, will be forced to submit lengthy and complex cases on diffi-
be substantially lessened and cases not going to the jury will be few indeed.
Id. at 573 (footnote omitted). Such a result occurs even if the shift in the burden of proof is
viewed as more conceptual than practical. See Birnbaum, supra note 19, at 608-09. The likelihood
of far more frequent verdicts in favor of plaintiffs, regardless of the true weight of the evidence,
can be expected.
74. A cutting pattern is needed. The subsequent history of Barker in the appellate courts of
California suggests that these courts are having difficulty applyiig its purportedly straightforward
definition and burden of proof standard. It appears that the appellate courts are seeking to inter-
pret Barker in a restrained fashion so as to circumvent the inherent unfairness of the decision.
See, e.g.. Cavers v. Cushman Motor Sales, 95 Cal. App. 3d 338, 157 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1979);
Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1978); Korli v. Ford Motor
Co., PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) T 8340 (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 18, 1978) (prior to decertification, this
opinion was reported at 84 Cal. App. 3d 895, 149 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1978)). See also Heritage v.
Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) T 8521 (Alaska, June 1, 1979). These
subsequent decisions are discussed by Wade, supra note 22, at 565, and by Birnbaum, supra note
19, at 608.
75. 593 P.2d at 885 (quoting Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at
236).
76. The attorney-client and work product privileges are greatly limited in product liability
litigation. See generally S. BALDWIN, F. HARE & F. McGOvERN, THE PREPARATION OF PROD-
UCT LIABILITY CASES § 5.1.4 (1981); L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 47.02
(1981); E. SCHWARTZ, HAZARDOUS PRODUCTS LITIGATION § 6.1 (1973).
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cult technical issues not even addressed as part of plaintiffs' cases in chief.
Juries often react to lengthy cases with the attitude of "where there is smoke
there is fire." 7 An extensive defense can be taken as an indication of smoke
even if not portrayed as a smoke screen by plaintiff's counsel. Experienced
litigators know that if their case requires substantially more time and raises
substantially more complex issues than does the case of their adversary, the
likely result is that their case is lost. The likelihood of obtaining a jury verdict
premised on the facts will frequently be unattainable with such a procedural
device regardless of the actual merits of the cases. Inasmuch as the jury sys-
tem is capable of returning fair verdicts on the fact whenever given a legiti-
mate opportunity to do so, it is appalling to make such a possibility largely
theoretical.
The assigned burden of proof is dependent upon the definition of defect.7 8
Despite the significant and growing number of successful product defect ac-
tions on a national scale, the judicial tendency is insidiously moving toward
rejection of any realistic balancing of the burden of proof. Any burden upon
the plaintiff which requires some evidence of culpable conduct by the defen-
dant is being eroded. The stated reason for this tendency is simply that utiliza-
tion of the traditional common law approaches to burden of proof require-
ments imposes too great a burden upon injured parties in product litigation.7 9
Rather than retain a balanced approach to burden of proof issues, courts
adopting the Barker-Beck approach appear to accept the premise that a man-
ufacturer is liable unless proven otherwise. Only such a premise as this can
support a rule that requires a defendant to defend the integrity of its entire
product in order to refute an unspecified defect assumed as a matter of law. In
many situations no technical evidence will be needed to support a plaintiff's
case in chief. Even the condition of the product can be established by lay
testimony, possibly even that of the injured party. If a plaintiff submits this
minimal evidence, the defendant must submit evidence to support the integrity
of the entire product. This is true, even if, as with an automobile, it has more
than 5,000 parts and various independent systems, all of which must be con-
solidated into a working whole and any one of which may or may not have
been the cause of the accident or the injury upon which the suit is premised.80
Conversely, there is no burden of proof upon the plaintiff to specify the system
alleged to be defective, nor the specific part, unless the case is premised on
component failure."
Many courts have considered and rejected the Barker-Beck approach.8 2
77. See generally A. MORRILL, TRIAL DIPLOMACY, SELECTED TEXT 95-96 (1973).
78. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
79. See cases cited supra note 27.
80. Although technically correct, it is also fair to note that by virtue of the facts surrounding
the injury and occurrence, a defendant is often able to narrow the focus of a specific design area
or component issue. This is also a probable expectation if the plaintiff is required to actually meet
the proximate cause requirement found in Barker without an inference of such causation arising
from the fact of product use and injury.
81. Defects fall into three generally recognized categories: (I) design; (2) component failure;
and (3) failure to adequately warn or instruct. Accord Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 428, 573 P.2d at 453,
143 Cal. Rptr. at 235 (1978); W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 99.
82. See, e.g., Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568
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Whether other courts will follow remains to be seen."8 This resistance to
Barker-Beck will, in the long run, benefit the consumer. The product will re-
main on the market, the producer will remain in business, the employees will
not be put out of work and the manufacturer will be more safety conscious
and more responsive to legitimate safety concerns.84
Distinct from the problems of defining defect and establishing proper bur-
den of proof standards are other related issues. A brief discussion of some of
the more important of these issues is necessary for a better understanding of
the reform proposals which conclude this Article.
IV. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
A. Contributory Negligence
A cornerstone of strict liability is the exclusion of evidence relating to the
plaintiff's contributory negligence, unless that conduct constitutes an assump-
tion of the risk or unforeseeable misuse of the product.86 Regardless of
whether the burden is upon the plaintiff to establish freedom from contribu-
tory negligence,8 6 or upon the defendant to establish its presence,8 7 the adher-
(1981); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322, reh'g denied, 282 Or. 411, 579
P.2d 1287 (1978). Of the 17 state supreme courts and various other courts which have considered
a proper definition of defect since Barker, only one has fully accepted the Barker approach. See
Birnbaum, supra note 19, at 601. One reason may be that Barker has "further confused the
delineation between strict liability and negligence concepts." Id.
83. For example, the opinion in Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456,
466 n.l, 424 N.E.2d 568, 576 n.1 (1981), observed the Barker approach and stated: "The appro-
priateness of this additional test was not raised by either party and we express no position
thereon." Thereafter, in Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 466, 432 N.E.2d 814,
818 (1982), the Barker approach was partially approved.
84. Most product manufacturers are deeply concerned with safety and seek to produce the
safest possible product as a function of their ethical obligations to society as well as the need to be
competitive. To the extent that litigation can heighten this concern, it should do so with a more
balanced burden of proof standard. Those manufacturers who fail to take proper steps to promote
product safety can readily be found liable under traditional burden of proof standards. To the
extent that such manufacturers leave the market, the general public is benefited.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965). See also Noel, Defective
Products: Abnormal Use. Contributory Negligence and Assumption of the Risk, 25 VAND. L.
REV. 93 (1972); Vargo, The Defenses to Strict Liability in Tort: A New Vocabulary with an Old
Meaning, 29 MERCER L. REV. 447 (1978). Numerous decisions have addressed one or more of
these issues. See, e.g., Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976); Daly v.
General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); Williams v.
Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298
N.E.2d .622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973); Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Or. 403, 547 P.2d 132
(1976); McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975).
86. As a matter of substantive New York law, the plaintiff must plead freedom from contrib-
utory negligence as a material element in a negligence claim (except claims for wrongful death or
employer's liability). H. WACHTEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE UNDER THE C.P.L.R. 122 (4th ed.
1973). The same problem can occur in the realm of conflict of laws. See Levy v. Streiger, 233
Mass. 600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919) (conflict between contributory negligence requirements of Mas-
sachusetts and Rhode Island).
87. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) requires that a party affirmatively set forth the
defense of contributory negligence. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
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ents of absolute strict liability have removed the issue from many cases.
In a crashworthiness action, a defendant may be permitted to present evi-
dence of the speed of the respective vehicles involved in the accident in order
to establish the forces involved or the movement of the plaintiff in relation to
injury causing factors. This evidence, however, may not be admissible on the
issue of plaintiff's wrongful conduct as a complete defense. 8 If the very same
accident results in a suit between individuals, however, the conduct of both
would be reviewed by the jury to determine both negligence and contributory
negligence or to apportion fault. If the actions were consolidated, a jury could
conclude that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent and thus could not re-
cover against the individual defendant or could have the judgment reduced.
Yet, the same jury could permit a full recovery against the manufacturer de-
fendant (regardless of culpability) on a strict liability theory. No reason exists
in law or logic to permit one class of defendants to escape unscathed due to
the conduct of the plaintiff, while another class of defendants is required to
pay for the entire loss created by the injury.
There is no remaining reason to bar conduct constituting contributory
negligence in a comparative law jurisdiction. Such conduct is not an absolute
defense in "pure" comparative fault states and is a complete defense in "modi-
fied" comparative fault states only if the plaintiff's improper conduct was ex-
cessive. 8 In modified comparative fault states, a policy decision was reached
by the legislatures that a person who substantially contributes to his own in-
jury merits no recovery from others. This policy is defeated by the rejection of
contributory fault evidence in actions against manufacturers. Making distinc-
tions between conduct constituting abuse, misuse, or assumption of the risk on
the one side and contributory negligence on the other has no valid purpose in
cases such as those described above. Difficult distinctions, such as whether a
drinking driver is contributorily negligent or has assumed the risk of his con-
duct, need not be resolved by juries or courts with the conflicting results such
determinations necessarily yield. Even if the behavior is deemed assumption of
the risk, it might be inadmissible if the risk assumed is "general" instead of
"specific," or if it was not related to the type of injuries sustained.'0
A recent decision of the Oregon Supreme Court," recognizing and re-
88. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978). Cf. Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974). For
example, a pilot's failure to properly inspect a fuel cap, resulting in the crash of the aircraft, was
not contributorily negligent as a matter of law in Ohio. See Rimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., PROD.
LIAB. REP. (CCH) 1 9028 (6th Cir., Feb. 19, 1981). The opinion does not specifically indicate
whether the evidence was admissible under the theory of strict liability in tort.
89. For an example of a "pure" comparative negligence statute, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 22.005 (West Supp. 1982), and for a "modified" form, see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 331.045 (West
1958).
90. Cf. Twerski, Selective Use of Comparative Fault, 16 TRIAL 30 (Nov. 1980). A more
realistic approach is exemplified by the decision in Vargus v. Pitman Mfg. Co., 510 F. Supp. 116,
PROD. LIAR. REP. (CCH) 9016 (E.D. Pa., Mar. !1, 1981). in Vargus the court permitted as-
sumption of the risk, in its primary and strict sense, to constitute a complete defense to an action
in strict liability and was thus in accord with the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act, 42
PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a)(Purdon 1982).
91. Baccelleri v. Hyster Co., 287 Or. 3, 597 P.2d 351 (1979).
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taining the comment n distinction of section 402A" received immediate
criticism:98
This limitation perpetuates a hard-to-apply distinction that,
after the extension of comparative negligence principles to strict
liability actions, is no longer useful.
Characterizing behavior as misuse, assumption of the risk or ordi-
nary contributory negligence was sometimes useful to the trier of
fact when products liability depended on an extension of negligence
or warranty doctrine and included the harsh common law approach
to defenses. But when the doctrine of strict products liability in tort
and comparative negligence are available, . . . any distinction
made between the defenses only interferes with the fact finder's
ability to examine the behavior of both parties and assess appropri-
ate liabilities.
9 4
The same author points out that of eleven states which have specifically ruled
on the question, six have abolished the distinction and five have retained it.95
A majority of courts have correctly found it appropriate to apply compar-
ative fault to strict liability actions in order to permit the entirety of each
party's contribution to the injury to be brought to the attention of the fact
finder. Retention of a distinction premised upon the categorization of plain-
tiff's conduct negates the benefits of this joinder.
B. State of the Art and Government Regulation
The areas of "state of the art" and "government regulation" must be con-
sidered as they relate to evidentiary issues. Both areas are the subject of treat-
ment in various product liability reform acts and in the Model Uniform Prod-
uct Liability Act." A legislative response is necessary to resolve the judicial
92. Comment n provides:
Contributory Negligence. Since the liability with which this Section deals is not
based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict
liability cases (see § 524) applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a
defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in
the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand
the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably
proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of
assumption of the risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict
liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger,
and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by
it, he is barred from recovery.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965).
93. Note, Assumption of the Risk as the Only Affirmative Defense Available in Strict Prod-
ucts Liability Actions in Oregon: Baccelleri v. Hyster Co., 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 495 (1981).
94. Id. at 495, 503-04.
95. The distinction has been rejected in Alaska, California, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New York and Wisconsin; it has been retained in Florida, Idaho, New Jersey, Oregon and Texas.
Id. at 513.
96. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT §§ 107-08 (1979).
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confusion surrounding the proper function of this type of evidence.97
1. State of the Art
State of the art evidence can be introduced to assist a plaintiff in estab-
lishing a prima facie case when the product fails to meet industry norms, or
where a safer alternative was practicable and technologically feasible at the
time of manufacture. Such evidence can be part of a manufacturer's effort to
establish the absence of a defect by proving that the harm was not foreseeable
in light of the knowledge available, 8 or that available technology precluded
production of a practicable safer alternative."a
It is uniformly recognized that there are real dangers inherent in raising
state of the art evidence to the level of conclusive presumption, or possibly
even rebuttal presumption status. 100 Such dangers have been overemphasized.
Courts have consistently determined that such evidence in negligence cases is
admissible only as some evidence of defect or nondefect. 101
This uniformity, however, is not observed in strict liability actions. Here a
split exists premised on the conduct versus product distinction. This distinction
does not justify rejecting state of the art evidence in strict product liability
actions, or in any product liability action, regardless of legal theory. State of
the art evidence bears directly on the question of "defect" and can only loosely
be considered within the realm of "conduct." A product incapable of practical
technological improvement at the time of manufacture should not be declared
defective merely because subsequent technological change made a safer prod-
uct possible. The hindsight test favored by some courts and commentators ig-
nores reality and is grossly inequitable.102
97. An example is found in the differences of opinion rendered by Texas appellate courts in
regard to the admissibility of evidence related to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 206, 49
C.F.R. § 571.206 (1981). Compare Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1974), with General Motors Corp. v. Turner, 567 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
98. This is a frequent assertion in chemical, drug, asbestosis and similar cases. The MODEL
UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 107(E) (1979) provides if a seller proves that it was not
within "practical technological feasibility" as defined in section 107(D) for it to make the product
safe in regard to design, warnings or instructions so as to prevent harm, the seller, in general, is
not liable for defects in design or failure to warn. See Schwartz, supra note 55, at 588.
99. Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1978); Nordstrom v.
White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 75 Wash. 2d 629, 453 P.2d 619 (1969).
100. The strongest criticism being that an entire industry can be laggard and fail to adopt
known, available safety devices. This was noted at least as early as the case of The T. J. Hooper,
60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
101. See Brandon v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 220 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (defect);
Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 75 Wash.2d 629, 453 P.2d 619 (1969)
(nondefect).
102. In Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 494, 525 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1974), the
court held that the test for strict liability in tort was whether "a reasonably prudent manufacturer
would have so designed and sold the article in question had he known of the risk involved which
injured the plaintiff." See also Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 177, 406
A.2d 140, 153 (1979). A respected commentator has gone even further and stated:
[I]t is not relevant that [the manufacturer] neither knew nor could have known nor
ought to have known in the exercise of ordinary care that the unreasonable risk
actually existed. It is enough that had he known of the risk and dangers he would
1982]
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:1
This concept is utilized as part of the formula by which juries are to
determine whether a manufacturer acted in a reasonably prudent manner. If
the manufacturer acted prudently, no liability will be found under this stan-
dard of conduct. Some courts have, as a matter of law, imputed knowledge of
the dangerous condition of the product to the manufacturer when instructing
the jury as to the factors to be balanced in reaching a decision.103 Such an
imputation effectively creates a situation in which it would be difficult for a
fact finder to find for a manufacturer. For example, in an automobile collision
wherein the plaintiff did not wear an available seat belt, the injured party
could assert that the manufacturer 'should have installed a passive restraint
system instead of the active restraint system in the vehicle.' Knowledge of
the danger of not doing so would be imputed to the manufacturer. This ap-
proach has been soundly criticized largely in connection with the decision in
Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co.""5
not have marketed the product at all or he would have done so differently.
Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398, 404 (1970). Such
a standard effectively negates any proof of available technology and state of the art. The feasibil-
ity of any design alternative is rendered irrelevant. No further extension of strict liability into
absolute liability can readily be envisioned. Ultimately, such an approach will make a manufac-
turer liable for failure to warn of an unknown danger. Such an absurdity is not beyond the capac-
ity of some courts. See Little v. PPG Indus., 19 Wash. App. 812, 818, 579 P.2d 940, 947 (1978),
modified, 92 Wash. 2d, 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979), in which the appellate court declared:
[l]f the product has dangerous propensities-even though they are unknown to the
manufacturer and reasonable care has been taken to make and market the prod-
uct-unless the dangerous [sic] are obvious or known to the user, the manufacturer
will be held strictly liable if it has not adequately warned the user of the dangers
inherent in the use of the product ....
How a manufacturer can warn of a specific danger, without a means to know that the danger
exists, remains unstated.
103. See, e.g., Brown v. Link Belt Corp., 565 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1977); Weems v. CBS
Imports Corp., 46 Or. App. 539, 612 P.2d 323 (1980); Baccelleri v. Hyster Co., 287 Or. 3, 597
P.2d 351 (1979); Myers v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 275 Or. 501, 553 P.2d 355 (1976); Phillips v.
Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
104. A passive system operates without any need for action by the vehicle operator. On the
other hand, an active system requires the vehicle occupant to affirmatively buckle a seat belt
system. Passive systems, such as airbags and certain seat belt restraint systems, were developed in
the 1970's and were not technically feasible for most production vehicles -until the late 1970's.
Subsequent experience has shown that substantial numbers of vehicle occupants disengage even
passive restraint systems. See Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Seat Belt Issues, 29
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 217, 218 n.7, 239 (1980). After conducting a survey of 79,000 Volkswagen
Rabbit automobiles equipped with passive belts and 300,000 automobiles with ordinary (active)
belts, the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration reported a "dramatic" reduction
in highway deaths due to the passive belt systems. The death .rate for the passive belt equipped
automobiles was approximately one-third the rate for other automobiles. 5 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB.
REP. (BNA) 729 (Sept. 30, 1977).
105. 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978). In Cepeda the plaintiff was injured after a safety
shield was removed from the pelletizing machine he was operating. It was conceded that had the
shield been in place the injury would not have occurred. Removal required the use of a wrench.
The court ruled in part that such a product could be defective because it lacked a fail safe device
which would have rendered the machine inoperable if the shield was removed. Such devices were
technically feasible at the time of manufacture, but were not in use. Id. at 180-81, 386 A.2d at
830-31. The decision was soundly criticized by Birnbaum, supra note 19, at 619, who viewed the
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A significant problem that emerges from a hindsight balancing
test (in which knowledge of the risk at the time of trial is imputed
to the manufacturer) is that manufacturers may be held liable for
dangerous propensities that were scientifically unknowable at the
time the product was placed into the stream of commerce. If a
manufacturer is precluded from defending on grounds of the scien-
tific impossibility of having foreseen the potential hazards, a risk-
utility analysis becomes a shallow fiction. It is questionable
whether a criterion for liability purportedly based on a notion of
reasonableness can be justly and fairly applied when cognition of
risks is imposed as a matter of law rather than as a matter of fact.
The threat of imposing what is tantamount to absolute liability
on the manufacturer for all harm resulting from the use of its prod-
uct is suggested in other areas of the Cepeda opinion as well. 06
At best, a duty to warn known purchasers of the product should be imposed as
a result of improvements in the state of the art. In other circumstances a prod-
uct recall might be in order.10 7
The division in the courts in connection with applying state of the art
evidence to strict liability actions has two aspects. First, some courts simply
distinguish between strict liability and negligence actions; and second, some
courts seem to distinguish between strict liability malfunction cases and strict
liability design cases.108 Considerable confusion can result within a single ju-
risdiction.109 Most importantly, state of the art evidence must be accorded the
weight it deserves.
2. Government Regulation
Evidence of compliance or noncompliance with applicable government
regulations can be instrumental in deciding evidentiary issues. Several states
have legislatively determined that compliance with such regulations creates a
decision as a muddled version of Barker requiring a manufacturer to employ safety device upon
safety device. Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979),
overruled Cepeda on the remarkable grounds that Cepeda imposed too great a burden of proof
upon the plaintiff. The hindsight perspective of Cepeda was retained, however. Id. at 167, 406
A.2d at 148.
106. Birnbaum, supra, note 19, at 622 (emphasis in original). Perhaps aware of this danger,
an Oregon court upheld a directed verdict in favor of defendants where a product warning suffi-
ciently alerted the plaintiff to the danger and where the addition of guards would not have pre-
vented the injury. See Gilmour v. Norris Paint & Varnish Co., PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 1 9021
(Or. App., May II, 1981).
107. Such recalls can be voluntary and will be helpful where the manufacturer can provide
the safety improvement. It is also possible for mandatory recalls to be ordered by various govern-
ment agencies such as authorized by section 152 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966 and regulations thereunder. Pub. L. No. 89-563, § 102, 80 Stat. 718 (1966) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976)); 49 C.F.R. § 577.6 (1981).
108. Compare Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1974) with Cunningham v.
MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 111. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970), discussed in Morano, The
State of the Art Defense in Illinois, Product Liability Law, 62 CHI. BAR REC. 240, 241 (1981).
109. Morano, supra note 108, at 246.
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presumption of non-defect. 1 0 In at least one state, government regulation
compliance is an absolute defense to a claim predicated on negligence.,
Voices have been raised against this development in an effort to limit the func-
tion of government regulation in product defect cases.'""
Government regulation provides uniformity and enables a manufacturer
to plan and design within recognizable parameters. If the government stan-
dard is specific and is recognized as a proper defense, it will obviate the neces-
sity of juries becoming arbiters of design on a retroactive basis with knowledge
of facts which were unknown to the manufacturer. Where an agency has care-
fully considered all aspects of the safety issue, as does the National Highway
and Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and has the capacity and will-
ingness to make independent tests and obtain independent studies,' 3 it is evi-
dent that industry input is not the deciding factor in the ultimate safety regu-
lations that follow. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards"" are
technologically meaningful, carefully written and are accurate reflections of
practicable state of the art technology. Permitting automobile manufacturers
110. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2804 (Supp. 1981) (evidence that product is not unrea-
sonably dangerous); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(i)(b) (Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
15-6(3) (1977). See also MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT §§ 107-08 (1979) which
provide that compliance with legislative or administrative regulations related to design or perform-
ance requires a finding of no defect unless the plaintiff proves a reasonably prudent seller would
and could have taken additional precautions. Conversely, proof of noncompliance establishes a
defect unless the seller shows that the failure to comply was a reasonable, prudent course of
conduct under the circumstances. Schwartz, supra note 55, at 588-89.
I11. See Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267, 273
(1977).
112. See Claybrook, Auto Protection: Beyond Federal Standards, 16 TRIAL 38 (Nov. 1980).
The author's main arguments against providing meaningful weight to government regulation com-
pliance are that such standards:
[S]et minimum thresholds, not necessarily state-of-the-art levels of performance.
Do not reflect the capability of the particular defendant because they are issued
on an industry-wide basis, not tailored to a particular company.
Must concentrate on high payoff problems without covering many crucial as-
pects of performance.
Often remain unchanged for long periods and become outdated.
Usually do not regulate the safety of products over their foreseeable lifetime.
Are often a function of political legislative decisions, with less reliance on evi-
dence as used by the courts.
Id.
113. For example, the Department of Transportation has sponsored numerous safety related
studies and conducted many automobile safety tests. Its authority and mandate to do so are dis-
cussed in Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 671 (6th Cir. 1972). The De-
partment has been responsible for many reports, including, Tri-Level Study of the Causes of
Traffic Accidents, Vol. I-Research Findings, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., Final Report No. HS 801-
334 *(Jan. 1977); Impact Tests of a Near-Production Air Cushion Restraint, Final Report (Sy-
nopsis) (1974); Teknekran Research, Inc., 1979 Survey of Public Perceptions On Highway Safety
(July 1979). It has been noted that "[tihe administrative agency charged with promulgating, ap-
plying and testing these standards employs numerous engineers and spends millions of dollars
annually for crash safety research, testing and evaluation." Hoenig, Products Liability Problems
and Proposed Reforms, 1977 INS. L.J. 213, 246.
114. 49 C.F.R. § 571 (1981); 15 U.S.C. § 1392 (1976).
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to obtain judicial benefits based upon regulation compliance is cost effective
and better supports the economic burden imposed by required compliance test-
ing and design modifications. A proper evidentiary role for compliance evi-
dence should sometimes bar a plaintiff from recovery. Such a role would make
recovery more difficult and require that a plaintiff produce meaningful evi-
dence of defect. At the very least it should negate the Barker-Beck approach
to defect definition and burden of proof.'1 5
Compliance evidence will be submitted to rebut the evidence of defect
offered during plaintiff's case in chief. A presumption of non-defect arising
from such evidence will meet the defendant's rebuttal obligation, thereby re-
quiring the plaintiff to come forward with sufficient evidence to support any
determination of defect. Failure to rebut this presumption would result in a
dismissal of the action through the use of a directed verdict. There is nothing
novel in this approach. When the regulations are reasonably recent the pre-
sumption of non-defect would be conclusive.
Only federal regulation can provide adequate uniformity in product safety
standards. The NHTSA has proven its capacity to meet its responsibility of
ensuring automotive safety. On a broader level, it is clear that only a legisla-
tive approach can resolve the numerous theoretical and practical problems cur-
rently existing in product liability litigation. A national act, or at least uniform
legislation enacted by the individual states, is necessary to return a semblance
of order, foreseeability and meaningful responsibility to the field. Only such an
approach can impose proper restraints on the revolution created by the judici-
ary and properly weigh the relative needs of both industry and consumers. The
courts have abdicated their responsibility to industry by focusing solely on a
social policy of protecting the injured. Such an abdication requires legislative
correction. Without such correction case aberrations such as Kampman v.
Dunham,""6 Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co.117 and Austin v. Ford
Motor Co. s18 will become commonplace.
V. APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY JUDGMENTS
A. Comparative Fault
An initial question relating to apportionment of damages arose as the
number of states adopting comparative fault principles rapidly grew at a time
somewhat paralleling the development and acceptance of strict liability.'"
115. See supra notes 61-84 and accompanying text.
116. 192 Colo. 448, 560 P.2d 91 (1977), discussed infra note 162.
117. 76 N.J. 152, 185-88, 386 A.2d 816, 832-34 (1978), discussed supra note 105.
118. 86 Wis. 2d 628, 273 N.W.2d 233 (1979), discussed infra note 135.
119. See supra note 6. General acceptance in both fields occurred during the period of the
mid- 1960's through the 1970's. See also Plant, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability,
40 LA. L. REV. 403, 404 (1980), where it was argued that utilizing comparative principles in
strict liability actions is consistent with the policy of Greenman. more realistic from the economic
perspective of small manufacturers, and suggested that such an approach would not impede devel-
opment of safer designs. Plant pointed out that: "[N]ot only have the majority of decisions applied
such principles but those that have rejected application have not based their position on policy
grounds. The refusal has been for conceptual or semantic reasons rather than policy considera-
tions." Id. at 417.
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From its inception, strict liability theory precluded the defense of contributory
negligence.'" Traditionally, comparative negligence statutes applied solely to
negligence actions. 2 ' Thus, a major gap arose in the orderly development of
product liability law. In a single action a plaintiff's contributory fault would be
considered in regard to his negligence, i.e., contribution to the injury causing
occurrence; yet, this same conduct would be precluded in regard to plaintiff's
strict liability claim. Acute counsel quickly learned to delete negligence claims
from appropriate product liability actions, thereby enabling them to avoid all
evidence reflecting adversely upon their client's behavior. Not only were poten-
tial judgment values enhanced, they were made possible in situations wherein
a plaintiff's conduct was the height of folly.
Various commentators quickly analyzed the situation and largely agreed
that comparative fault principles should apply to strict liability actions. 22 A
significant number of judicial opinions soon concurred. 23 The necessity for
such a merger of legal policy, soundly crossing semantic and technical barri-
ers, is well illustrated in automobile crashworthiness cases.
Driver error is the single most common cause of injury producing acci-
dents.124 Unless such behavior is admissible, a vast number of specious cases
would result. The distinction between the cause of an accident and the cause
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965); McCown v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975); Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal.
App. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976); Contra Atkins v. American Motors Corp.,
335 So.2d 134 (Ala. 1976); McCarty v. F. C. Kingston Co., 22 Ariz. App. 17, 522 P.2d 778
(1974); McGoldrick v. Porter-Cable Tools, 34 Cal. App. 3d 885, 110 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1973);
Barth v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968). McCarty
treated the special circumstance in which plaintiff's contributory negligence was found to be the
sole proximate cause of injury.
121. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AIR. L. &
COM. 107 (1976); Carestia, The Interaction of Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Lia-
bility-Where Are We?, 47 INS. COUNS. J. 53 (1980); Epstein, supra note 52, at 463; Fleming,
The Supreme Court of California 1974-1975-Forward: Comparative Negligence at Last-By Ju-
dicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 239, 269-71 (1976); Noel, supra note 85, at 117-18; Plant,
supra, note 119; Schwartz, Pure Comparative Negligence in Action, 34 ATLA L. J. 117, 129
(1972); Wade, A Uniform Comparative Fault Act-What Should It Provide? 10 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 220 (1977).
123. See, e.g., Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975); Sun Valley
Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Hagenbach v. Snap-On
Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575
P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967);
General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1977). Contra Seay v. Chrysler
Corp., 93 Wash. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980). A recent article commenting on this decision
indicated that 16 of 19 jurisdictions which have considered the applicability of comparative fault
in strict liability actions have determined that comparative fault should be applied. See Note,
Products Liability-Washington Refuses to Allow Comparative Negligence to Reduce a Strict
Liability Award, 56 WASH. L. RaV. 307, 308 n.8 (1981).
124. See Final Report, supra note 113, at 19. Improper driving was a factor in 87% of all
accidents reported in 1976 and in 77% of the fatal accidents for that period. NATIONAL SAFETY
COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 48 (1977). Drinking is indicated as a factor in at least one-half of the
fatal accidents. Id. at 52. Other forms of driver error include inattention, distraction, drowsiness,
drug abuse, improper vehicle maintenance and lack of basic driving skills.
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of injury or enhanced injury underlies crashworthiness theory."" It is impera-
tive that this distinction be limited. Logic, policy and inherent fairness dictate
a unitary approach when weighing the factors which created the entire injury
producing sequence. Collision related injuries require two events-the first and
second collisions. Without the first the second cannot occur. The fact finder
must be apprised of the cause or causes of both collisions. Such knowledge will
permit a proper evaluation of the total picture and its distinct parts. Courts
presently recognize that the relative fault of an offending driver and a manu-
facturer can be apportioned." 6 Nothing stands in the way of permitting the
same apportionment when the offending driver is also the plaintiff. Any other
approach would exalt form over substance to an unprecedented degree. The
underlying cause of action cannot be permitted to become a tool for negation
of a fair apportionment of fault. Courts have become aware that they can
justly apportion fault while retaining strict liability."' A similar apportion-
ment between collision and injury causes should be made.
The trend toward applying comparative principles in strict
products liability actions is a constructive one. It indicates that
courts place a high value on fairness to both parties to the action.
Under a comparative system a negligent plaintiff will not recover a
windfall gain. He will recover only those damages for which he is
not at fault. Conversely, the manufacturer will be liable only for
the damage produced by his defective product.
Courts should place more emphasis upon fairness than seman-
tic and conceptual purity . . . . They need not be self-conscious
about applying either comparative negligence or comparative fault
in strict products liability cases. Strict products liability is a
"quasi-fault" doctrine. The "apples and oranges" argument is not
persuasive in light of this. It does not warrant a denial of loss allo-
cation, nor even a semantic maneuver to justify a fault
comparison. 1
8
This development, while valuable, is inadequate for the full protection of
defendants in certain cases. For comparative fault to be a viable complement
to strict liability, the vestiges of joint and several liability must be abolished.
The social and legal justifications for joint and several liability are incompati-
ble with the social and legal justifications for comparative fault.1 9
Retention of joint and several liability in comparative fault jurisdictions
creates a situation in which the findings of the jury can be overcome by an
arbitrary application of law. This application results in the casting of one or
more defendants into the role of insurer for the others. Perhaps the most obvi-
ous case in which such a situation arises is automotive crashworthiness. If
plaintiff is properly driving his vehicle through an intersection and that vehicle
125. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
126. See Elsasser v. American Motors Corp., 81 Mich. App. 379, 265 N.W.2d 339 (1978),
and cases cited supra note 115.
127. See cases cited supra note 123.
128. Carestia, supra, note 122, at 71 (emphasis and citations omitted).
129. For a discussion of joint and several liability see infra notes 146-94 and accompanying
1982]
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
is struck by another (whose driver is clearly at fault), distinct claims for relief
are available. The offending driver is defendant A and the manufacturer of the
plaintiff's vehicle is defendant B. A jury will find A to be the primary
tortfeasor. Assume a ninety to ten percent division of fault and a two million
dollar judgment. To the extent that A is judgment proof, B, who is jointly
liable, will satisfy the judgment. The jury believes that B should pay $200,000
and A $1.8 million. If A can pay only $500,000 as his maximum insurance or
less,1 3 0 the manufacturer, B, becomes liable for the $1.3 million differential.
The jury function has been subverted and the manufacturer insures that the
total judgment will be paid. B is then the de facto insurer of A. Under modern
crashworthiness law, it is almost inevitable that some modicum of liability will
be imposed on the manufactuer, thereby creating potential liability for the
entire sum. 3 '
The American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA), a major group sup-
porting comparative fault principles as necessary to prevent the all-or-nothing
result of common law contributory negligence has recently published a sympo-
sium dealing with product liability issues."32 It is not surprising to observe that
ATLA now seeks to completely abolish evidence of conduct in product defect
litigation. A major contributor to the symposium addressed the question of
whether comparative fault should be applied in strict liability actions. 33 The
article contends that in many strict liability actions comparative fault should
not be applied, especially when the conduct of the injured party is equivalent
to contributory negligence.13 4
The proponents of comparative fault appear to be as concerned with the
preclusion of conduct evidence as they are with the fairness of comparative
fault principles. For example, Professor Twerski asserts the validity of the rea-
soning in Austin v. Ford Motor Co.""5 where the court refused to compare the
plaintiff's conduct of improperly driving her vehicle at ninety miles per hour
with defendant's marketing of a vehicle with defective seat belts. The underly-
ing premise was that behavior cannot be compared to end product because the
concept of strict liability removes fault issues from consideration. Such a pre-
mise ignores the fact that an end product is the function of the conduct of
numerous persons. Whether a jury focuses on conduct per se or the product
130. Under the New York Accident Indemnification Law, 27 N.Y. INS. LAW § 610 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1982), the minimum required for personal injury liability insurance is $10,000 for
personal injury to one person ($20,000 coverage for more than one person) and $50,000 for one
death ($100,000 for more than one death). In Ohio, the Financial Responsibility Law requires no
insurance unless there is an unpaid judgment against the owner of the vehicle, in which case the
owner must obtain liability coverage to a minimum of $12,500 for personal injury to one person
($25,000 for more than one person). OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.51 (Page 1973). In an era of
six and seven figure liability judgments, competent counsel will often seek a deeper pocket than
that provided by the adverse, at fault, driver and/or vehicle owner.
131. Continued adherence to principles of joint and several liability multiplies the bad results
which arise from a refusal to apply comparative fault principles to strict liability actions. See infra
notes 146-94 and accompanying text.
132. 16 TRIAL 30 (Nov. 1980).
133. Twerski, supra note 90, at 30. See also Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Comparative
Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REv. 797 (1977).
134. Twerski, supra note 90, at 31, 35.
135. 86 Wis. 2d 628, 273 N.W.2d 233 (1979).
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per se if that product is defective, the defect is directly related to a flawed
decision making or production process. Juries are being asked to simply com-
pare the type of conduct which results in a product defect with the type of
conduct which causes an accident. No amount of terminological exercise can
remove the fact that conduct-fault resulted in the defective product. A jury
apportioning fault directly in regard to a known individual's behavior can also
apportion fault which arises indirectly through an unknown person's behavior.
Numerous juries have already established that this task can be performed.' 36
Professor Twerski argues that the Austin result was correct for two rea-
sons: (1) the negligence of the plaintiff was not directed to her use of the
product. The negligence was directed to herself and other drivers; and (2) if
contributory negligence is permitted as a defense, Ford's safety features only
exist to protect non-negligent drivers. 13
The first justification ignores the fact that plaintiff's negligence was the
precipitate or proximate cause of the accident. This behavior occurred during
the use of the product. Certainly it can be said that Mrs. Austin did not care
about the abuse of her automobile, but her actions were directly and specifi-
cally related to that automobile. General negligence or not, if she had not been
driving her automobile recklessly, she would not have been involved in a high
speed collision. Her negligence was not a considered act directed toward her
safety or the safety features of the vehicle. A negligent act, by definition, is
unintentional. Nevertheless, Twerski asserts that her general negligence can-
not be compared to the defendant's acts in the manufacture of a defective seat
belt which is a specific wrong causing specific harm.138
To attempt a distinction between general and specific negligence is crea-
tive, but unrealistic. "Where the product itself 'shouts out' the inherent dan-
ger, the user is cautioned to utilize proper care by the very best of all warn-
ings-his own sense and knowledge that his carelessness will result in
harm.,"'O
The second argument attempts too much. An automobile manufacturer
designs safety features to protect negligent and non-negligent vehicle occu-
pants alike. No technological means exist to nullify a safety device based on
such a distinction. Similarly, motor vehicle occupants should be compelled to
take reasonable steps of self protection. All parties recognized that, like ciga-
rettes, automobiles can imperil longevity. No safety device is fail-safe and no
driver is error free. When the defect in the automobile combines with the de-
fect in operator conduct, injury results. The acts must occur together. Profes-
sor Twerski is apparently seeking a moment in time in which the rules of the
road yield to the policy of injury compensation. In other words, he would have
us distinguish between the combination of circumstances that led to the acci-
dent and those which led to the injury. This distinction can be used to deline-
ate the causes of various injuries but fails when applied to the broader scale of
accident-injury causation.
The laws of physics are immutable; injury cannot occur without force.
136. See supra note 123.
137. Twerski, supra note 90, at 33.
138. Id.
139. Hoenig & Goetz, A Rational Approach to "Crashworthy" Automobiles: The Need for
Judicial Responsibility, 6 Sw. U. L. REv. 1, 73 (1974).
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That force is generated by the collision. For a jury to be told to disregard the
actions which placed the force into motion is to defy both logic and physics. It
is precisely conduct equatable with contributory negligence which must be
part of a jury's apportionment function. The vast majority of courts have rec-
ognized this fact and are more realistic in their ultimate analyses and results.
Even Professor Twerski recognized that
[tihere are cases where the plaintiff's failure to repair a product or
the plaintiff's misuse of a product should be utilized to reduce a
verdict even if the theory is strict products liability.
This process of line drawing is yet in its infancy. Nevertheless,
recent case law gives evidence that courts are willing to follow their
common sense instincts when the issues are clearly and crisply
presented for decision. " 0
Thus it is admitted that conduct can be compared to defect or, more specifi-
cally, that comparative fault principles are consistent with strict liability prin-
ciples, at least when a line can be drawn to encompass them. How this process
of line drawing is to be achieved is unstated, and the process itself is unattain-
able. The distinctions suggested by Professor Twerski will fail of their own
inherent complexities and the contradictory decisions that would be spawned.
Finally, Professor Twerski sets forth a myriad of arguments against appli-
cation of comparative fault in strict liability actions. These arguments have
been refuted by courts and commentators alike."' At least one of these argu-
ments, however, requires a response. Professor Twerski, at related but quite
separate points, stated: "It makes little sense to reduce the defendant's liability
exposure when the plaintiff has responded as expected." ' He also stated:
"[I]n essence, once a product with a design defect is marketed, we know with
substantial certainty that there will be a victim. ... ,1
Just as foreseeability of an accident is not an independent basis for impos-
ing negligence liability, such foreseeability must not be equated with an expec-
tancy that an injury will occur. It is the conduct of an individual that will turn
foreseeability into the "expected" act. A punch press manufacturer may have
no expectancy that a person will lose a hand when a safety shield is removed
and not returned prior to activating the machine. That manufacturer has the
right to expect that this will not occur even though he can foresee the possibil-
ity."' Only when the circumstances of removal, plus operation, plus careless-
ness arise will the injury occur. Presses have been utilized for many years
without causing injury. To discount the circumstances which finally turned
foreseeable misuse into expected injury from such misuse is to say that justice
is not only blind to the status of the parties, but is also blind to the facts of the
case.
140. Twerski, supra note 90, at 35.
141. See supra notes 122-23.
142. Twerski, supra note 90, at 31.
143. Id. at 30.
144. Nevertheless, a cause of action in just such a case was upheld in Cepeda v. Cumberland
Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978). See supra note 105.
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Of course, automobiles will occasionally fall off a bridge or be driven into
a body of water. It is foreseeable that this will happen. If it does occur, some-
one will likely be injured or drowned. There is "substantial certainty" of sev-
eral such injuries every year. Consumers and manufacturers alike can be said
to expect this to occur, yet neither acts on that premise. No court has yet
suggested that every expectancy of injury must be protected against. Further-
more, no court has ordered vehicles to be equipped with oxygen tanks, inflat-
able rafts or pontoons to avoid the risk of being labelled defective. Expectancy
is not the issue. To parlay substantial certainty of injury to an expectancy of
injury to culpability is too devious a means to an end of compensation. Expec-
tancy goes beyond the concept of foreseeable misuse-already a broad base for
imposition of liability-into the realm of pure speculation.
It is known with substantial certainty that a drunk driver is likely to crash
some day and cause one or more deaths. If Professor Twerski's approach were
fully accepted, this expected conduct would not be admissible even in an ac-
tion brought on behalf of a deceased drunk driver against the automobile man-
ufacturer. As with the conduct of Mrs. Austin,14 5 the drunk driver's conduct
could be labelled as mere general negligence instead of product oriented or
safety oriented negligence. Paradoxically, this very same conduct would sup-
port a suit against the estate of the same drunk driver if such an action were
brought by one of the victims of his driving. In such a case, it is the defendant
manufacturer who is improperly penalized, not the negligent driver.
The use of comparative fault in strict liability actions penalizes no one. Its
use declares simply and equitably that a product failure and a human failure
require similar appraisal to provide fair compensation for the harm caused by
each.
B. Joint and Several Liability
Regardless of whether the governing comparative fault statute is specifi-
cally limited to negligence, 146 or is more broadly framed to include all personal
injury actions117 such as strict liability, an overriding question is the effect
upon the outmoded doctrine of joint and several liability. A few statutes spe-
cifically provide for retention of joint and several liability, 48 while other stat-
utes specifically abolish the doctrine.1 4 ' Other statutes are silent.1 50 The vac-
uum left by many legislatures has been filled by judicial interpretation and
145. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
146. E.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp.
1982-83); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page Supp. 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036
(1973 & Supp. 1982); WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (Michie 1977 & Supp. 1982). See generally V.
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 2.2, at 34 n.29 (1974 & Supp. 1981).
147. E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1979); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1982).
148. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-803, 804 (1971 & Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01(1)
(West Supp. 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1973 & Supp. 1981); WYO. STAT. § 1-1-
109(b)(ii) (1977). See generally V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 146, 16.4, at 253 (Supp. 1981).
149. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A) (2)
(Page Supp. 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973 & Supp. 1982). See generally V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 146, § 16.4 (Supp. 1981).
150. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 13-14 (West 1979 & Supp. 1981-82).
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intervention.
The judicial approach was virtually unanimous in determining that com-
parative fault could coexist with joint and several liability until the mid-
1970's. As to that period, Professor Schwartz stated: "The concept of joint and
several liability of tortfeasors has been retained under comparative negligence,
unless the statute specifically abolishes it, in all states that have been called
upon to decide the question."1 5 ' The inherent unfairness of such an approach
has been instrumental in developing a trend to abolish joint and several liabil-
ity in comparative fault actions. This trend was observed by Professor
Schwartz:
There is a minority trend in the direction of abrogating the com-
mon law doctrine of joint and several liability. A Wisconsin federal
district court held a manufacturer-defendant responsible only for
his causal negligence . . . . Oklahoma courts apply joint and sev-
eral liability when damages cannot be apportioned ...
The comparative negligence statutes of Kansas, Ohio, Ver-
mont, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire and Louisiana explicitly abol-
ish joint and several liability. However, the Pennsylvania statute,
and New Hampshire courts impose joint and several liability when
the plaintiff can only recover from one defendant because of immu-
nities or other procedural bars.152
Other jurisdictions which retain joint and several liability have permitted
"equitable adjustments approaching apportionment."1 M There is a secondary
question posed by decisions 1" wherein joint and several liability remains if the
co-defendant is immune from suit.15
The trend toward abrogation of joint and several liability is consistent
with the unitary approach which mandates application of comparative fault in
strict liability actions. Both developments require that the court review the
total picture of ultimate liability to produce equitable results. The Kansas Su-
preme Court may have been the first to terminate joint and several liability in
comparative fault actions."56 The principles and reasoning of these negligence
based decisions apply with equal force to strict liability actions.
In Brown v. Keill,157 the court noted that under the Kansas statute the
concept of joint and several liability no longer applied even if one of the par-
ties at fault could not be joined as a defendant or be held legally responsi-
151. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 146, § 16.4, at 253.
152. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 146, § 16.4, at 120 (Supp. 1981) (footnotes omitted).
153. Id. at 120-22 (citations omitted).
154. E.g.. Simonsen v. Barlo Plastics Co., 551 F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1977).
155. See generally, V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 146, § 16.5, at 254 (Supp. 1981). The better
view is to consider the negligence of all contributing parties regardless of whether they can be
joined as defendants. Such a position is "more compatible with the goals of comparative negli-
gence" as it determines the negligence of all concurrent tortfeasors. Id. § 16.5, at 122 (Supp.
1981). See also infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
156. See Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 204, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (1978); Miles v. West, 224
Kan. 284, 286, 580 P.2d 876, 880 (1978).
157. 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978) (automobile owner, whose vehicle was involved in a
collision while being driven by his son, sued the other driver for property damage).
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ble. "15 The purpose of the statute was found to be twofold: (1) to abolish con-
tributory negligence as a bar to recovery; and (2) to impose individual liability
for damages based on the proportionate fault of all parties to the
occurrence.'
59
The opinion indicates complete awareness of the fact that no longer will
the inability of one judgment debtor to pay his share fall solely upon the re-
maining judgment debtors. In its full and well-reasoned statement in support
of its break with tradition, the court stated:
The legislature intended to equate recovery and duty to pay to
degree of fault. Of necessity, this involved a change of both the
doctrine of contributory negligence and of joint and several liabil-
ity. There is nothing inherently fair about a defendant who is 10%
at fault paying 100% of the loss, and there is no social policy that
should compel defendants to pay more than their fair share of the
loss. Plaintiffs now take the parties as they find them. If one of the
parties at fault happens to be a spouse or a governmental agency
and if by reason of some competing social policy the plaintiff can-
not receive payment for his injuries from the spouse or agency,
there is no compelling social policy which requires the codefendant
to pay more than his fair share of the loss. The same is true if one
of the defendants is wealthy and the other is not. Previously, when
the plaintiff had to be totally without negligence to recover and the
defendants had to be merely negligent to incur an obligation to
pay, an argument could be made which justified putting the burden
of seeking contribution on the defendants. Such an argument is no
longer compelling because of the purpose and intent behind the
adoption of the comparative negligence statute.1 60
The second decision, Miles v. West,161 clarified further the policy consid-
158. Id. at 207, 580 P.2d at 876.
159. Id. at 197, 580 P.2d at 870.
160. Id. at 203, 580 P.2d at 873-74. The court's ruling was premised in part on the belief
that a contrary ruling would have rendered § 60-258a(d) of the Kansas statute meaningless. That
section provides:
Where the comparative negligence of the parties in any action is an issue and recov-
ery is allowed against more than one party, each such party shall be liable for that
portion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages to any claimant in the pro-
portion that the amount of his or her causal negligence bears to the amount of the
causal negligence attributed to all parties against whom such recovery is allowed.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (1976).
161. 224 Kan. 284, 580 P.2d 876 (1978). Plaintiffs were involved in a collision when a vehi-
cle operated by their husband/father collided with another vehicle. Brown was subsequently relied
upon in Geier v. Wikel, 4 Kan. App. 2d 188, 603 P.2d 1028 (1979), to decide that the fault of a
released party would be taken into account when determining liability of nonreleased defendants.
The release was not a bar to the action.
An injured party whose claim for damages is exclusively subject to the Kansas com-
parative negligence statute may now settle with any person or entity whose fault
may have contributed to the injuries without that settlement in any way affecting
his or her right to recover from any other party liable under the act. The injured
party is entitled to keep the advantage of his or her bargaining, just as he or she
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erations. Miles specifically rejected the contrary approach adopted by Colo-
rado, which it viewed as the harsh result comparative negligence was intended
to prevent." 2 In reaching its conclusion, the Miles court balanced the detri-
mental effect of a plaintiff able to recover only a portion of the injury value
against the benefit of a recovery despite his contributory negligence. This bal-
ance required abolition of joint and several liability:
The ill fortune of being injured by an immune or judgment-proof
person now falls upon plaintiffs rather than upon the other defen-
dants . . . . The risk of such ill fortune is the price the plaintiffs
must pay for being relieved of the burden formerly placed upon
them by the complete bar to recovery based on contributory
negligence.""3
Shortly thereafter, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Laubach v. Mor-
gan,'6" without reference to the Kansas precedents, reached the same conclu-
sion in a case in which the plaintiff was thirty and the defendants fifty and
twenty percent at fault respectively. 1 1
As a first step in its analysis, the court in Laubach concurred with Walton
v. Tull, 6 6 which reiterated that the basic purpose of comparative fault is to
distribute total damages among those who caused them. 1 7 This policy is con-
sistent with the primary policy of strict liability in tort which seeks to place
liability upon the party primarily responsible for the injury.1 6 Nothing in the
policies which support strict liability suggests that primary responsibility
should be equated with total liability regardless of fault. Abolition of negli-
gence proof requirements does not, and cannot, constitute abdication of fault
as the basic premise for a just determination of liability.
As the Kansas courts before it, the Laubach court observed that where
fault can be attributed it should be apportioned accordingly:
This principle of entire liability is of questionable soundness under
a comparative system where a jury determines the precise amount
of fault attributable to each party . . . . If a jury is capable of
apportioning fault between a plaintiff and defendant, it should be
no more difficult for it to allocate fault among several defendants.
must live with an inadequate settlement should the jury determine larger damages
or a larger proportion of fault than the injured party anticipated when the settle-
ment was reached.
Id. at 190, 603 P.2d at 1030.
162. 224 Kan. at 286, 580 P.2d at 880. The Colorado decision, Kampman v. Dunham, 192
Colo. 448, 560 P.2d 91 (1977), applied joint and several liability in a comparative fault action.
The ruling resulted in an adverse driver being held responsible for 100% of the judgment even
though he was found to be only 1% at fault. Kampman best illustrates the perverse and unfair
results of a rigid application of outmoded dogma.
163. 224 Kan. 287, 580 P.2d at 880.
164. 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978). Cf., Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613
(Okla. 1980) (involved an "admittedly blame free plaintiff" and thus Laubach is distinguishable).
165. The action in Laubach arose out of a three-vehicle collision.
166. 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d 20 (1962).
167. Id. at 893, 356 S.W.2d at 26.
168. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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Holding a defendant tortfeasor, who is only 20 percent at fault,
liable for [the] entire amount of damages is obviously inconsistent
with the equitable principles of comparative negligence .... 169
The opinion also resolved the issue of the effect abrogation of joint and
several liability could have on an injured plaintiff when a defendant is judg-
ment proof.
It is argued this could work a hardship on a plaintiff if one co-
defendant is insolvent. But the specter of the judgment-proof
wrongdoer is always with us, whether there is one defendant or
many. We decline to turn a policy decision on an apparition. There
is no solution that would not work an inequity . . . in some con-
ceivable situation . .. . 1
The pseudo-logic of earlier decisions which retained joint and several lia-
bility in comparative fault cases was shattered by the forthright statements
quoted above. A similar result was achieved in the case of Barron v. United
States, 7' which adopted a line of reasoning similar to Laubach. All the more
remarkable is that each decision resulted in a substantial reduction of the
damages recovered because a joint tortfeasor could not be sued due to immu-
nity,' 7  or by the operation of an applicable workmen's compensation stat-
ute. 17 Each opinion expressly or tacitly recognized the absence of any judicial
policy supporting full recovery in all cases regardless of fault. 174
The essence of the reasoning which supports retention of joint and several
liability is that it may foster full compensation to an injured party regardless
of that party's relative innocence or the relative culpability of the defendants.
This is not a supportable basis for decision; it is instead a rationalization uti-
lized to attain a dubious result.
The weakness of any policy retaining joint and several liability in compar-
169. 588 P.2d at 1074-75.
170. Id. at 1075.
171. 473 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Hawaii 1979). Plaintiff asserted that the concurrent negligence
of the Navy and a contractor combined to cause his injury during an excavation procedure. The
court found that plaintiff's action against the contractor was barred under an applicable work-
mens' compensaton provision. Nevertheless, the contributory fault of the contractor was to be
considered in determining the scope of the Navy's liability. The court stated:
3[P]laintiff is barred from recovering from the government damages attributable to
the contractor's negligence. The logical, as well as the fair and reasonable, result is
for the Court to determine the percentage of fault attributable to the government
and apply the resulting percentage to the damages sustained by plaintiff. If...
comparative fault can be determined for purposes of contribution, it can be deter-
mined as well to ascertain the proportion of damage to be assessed against one of
two tortfeasors where the other has been immunized against liability.
Id. at 1088 (footnote omitted). Cf. Sugue v. F. L. Smithe Mach. Co., 56 Hawaii 598, 546 P.2d
527 (1976).
172. E.g., Miles v. West, 224 Kan. at 287, 580 P.2d at 880.
173. E.g.. Barron v. United States, 473 F. Supp. at 1085.
174. See. e.g., the excellent discussion in Judge Clark's dissent in American Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 615, 578 P.2d 899, 921, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 204 (1978)
(Clark, J., dissenting).
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ative fault product liability actions is implicitly conceded by jurisdictions
which have adopted some form of "equitable apportionment" among joint
tortfeasors. 75 In these cases, the underlying theory of the action is readily
found irrelevant.
The theory of equitable apportionment is the unhappy result of forcibly
marrying comparative fault to joint and several liability. The end product
evokes memories of the hybrid discussed by Professor Cavers171 as one solution
to the famous decision in Adams v. Knickerbocker Society.1"7 As noted in a
recent California decision, 78 equitable apportionment is premised upon (1) di-
minishing recovery in proportion to the injured parties' contribution to the in-
jury;17 9 and (2) retaining individual liability for the total compensable loss
while permitting each defendant to obtain contribution on the basis of compar-
ative fault principles.
8 0
This solution does not adequately resolve the case in which one or more of
the defendants is insolvent or cannot be made to pay its share. Absent this
situation, the plaintiff has no reason to seek more than a proportional share
from any defendant; each will pay as required by the judgment. Only if one
defendant fails to pay will another defendant be required to make up the dif-
ference, and that defendant, just as the plaintiff, will be unable to recover
from the defaulting judgment debtor.
To be consistent with precepts of fairness and the policies which underlie
comparative fault, at least two specific goals should be met by principles of
apportionment: (1) to move contribution from a per capita basis to a propor-
tionate basis; and (2) to permit each defendant a legitimate opportunity to
reduce its ultimate liability exposure by placing a ceiling on that liability.
In an uncollectible judgment debtor situation, the plaintiff will look to the
remaining defendant or defendants to make him whole. The defendant will
seek to limit liability to its share of fault, only to find that the principles of
apportionment have become inapplicable. Liability premised upon proportion-
ate fault, the mainstay of the action until this moment, has suddenly
disappeared.
This process illustrates that the principle of apportionment and its sup-
porting superstructure comprise an enormous non sequitur. The right to equi-
table apportionment is not sufficiently applied in the very situations where it
should prevail. The full risk of loss remains on the individual defendant despite
the equitable principles of comparative fault because some courts are applying
the equities inequitably.
The ultimate question is not one of legislative intent. Rather, the ultimate
175. The concept was seen as early as Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105
(1962), but received its modern label and a lengthy exposition in American Motorcycle Ass'n v.
Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978). See also Transit
Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 134, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360, 366 (1979).
176. D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 39 (1965).
177. Id. at 19-32.
178. Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1979).
179. Id. at 134, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 366 (citing Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 828-29,
532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975)).
180. Id. (citing American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior court, 20 Cal. 3d at 588, 578 P.2d at
905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (1978)).
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question is simply the traditional problem of who should properly bear the risk
of loss for the wrongful acts of a third party. A true paradox is found when
the courts place this burden upon a defendant whose share of proportionate
fault is less than that of the plaintiff's."'8
So long as our justice system remains founded on the premise of
fault' -which underlies all tort compensation theories-it is improper to im-
pose liability without fault. Adherence to joint and several liability under mod-
ern comparative fault principles approaches the imposition of absolute liability
through a bootstrap operation. In other words, since defendant A is ten per-
cent liable due to his fault contribution, the court will arbitrarily and abso-
lutely impose all remaining fault upon A whenever it believes an injured per-
son is entitled to a more complete recovery than obtainable from the joint
tortfeasors. The courts which follow and accept the proposition that this result
is premised upon a "pragmatic policy determination" are merely saying that
their policy is to protect the injured party regardless of the fairness of the
result. Equitable apportionment is an effort to cure the inherently unfair and
illogical results flowing from application of joint and several liability. From a
pragmatic viewpoint, the effort falls short of this goal, as it simply does not
work. How a rule which is "pragmatically sound, as well as realistically
fair, '"83 when applied among concurrent tortfeasors becomes unsound and re-
alistically unfair when applied to all parties remains unclear. This particular
issue was noted in Laubach v. Morgan'" where the court found comparative
fault encompassed all parties and stated:
The underlying principle of comparative negligence is founded on
181. See, e.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying Nebraska
law); Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976). Contra Laubach v. Morgan,
588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978).
182. "Fault" is used in a broad sense. Even where a claim is premised upon a theory of
breach of warranty or strict liability, the "defect" or "danger" or inability to meet the norms of
warranty law exists only because of a human error in design or production. This fault exists in the
absence of moral blameworthiness and regardless of whether the defendant acted with reasonable
care. As noted by Prosser:
It is now more or less generally recognized that the "fault" upon which liability may
rest is social fault, which may but does not necessarily coincide with personal immo-
rality. The law finds "fault" in a failure to live up to an ideal standard of conduct
which may be beyond the knowledge or capacity of the individual, and in acts which
are normal and usual in the community, and without moral reproach in its eyes. It
will impose liability for good intentions and for innocent mistakes. . . .In the legal
sense, "fault" has come to mean no more than a departure from the conduct re-
quired of man by society for the protection of others, and it is the public and social
interest which determines what is required. The twentieth century has seen the de-
velopment of entire fields of liability in which the defendants are held liable for
well-intentioned and entirely moral and reasonable conduct, because it is considered
to be good social policy that their enterprises should pay their way by bearing the
loss they inflict.
W. PROSSER, supra note 34, at 18 (footnotes omitted).
183. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 598, 578 P.2d at 911, 146
Cal. Rptr. at 194 (quoting Kelley v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 29, 286 N.E.2d
241, 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851, 854 (1972)).
184. 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978). See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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attaching liability in direct proportion to the respective fault of
each person whose negligence caused the damage. The logical ex-
tension of this doctrine would apply it as among multiple
tortfeasors as well as between plaintiff and defendant. If liability
attaches to each tortfeasor in proportion to his comparative fault,
there will be no need for added litigation by defendants seeking
contribution.18 5
Rejection of joint and several liability in such cases is the only completely
satisfactory method of resolution. Only by having all parties before the court
in a single action is it possible to apportion fault. A further action for contri-
bution not only creates further litigation, but destroys the risk of loss princi-
ples embodied in comparative fault. Unquestionably, the most flagrant abuse
of both legislative intent and policy is found in crashworthiness actions where
the very quality and character of the respective parties can be entirely
dissimilar.
Abolition of joint and several liability in comparative fault actions results
in many benefits, including: (1) consistency with the equitable principles of
comparative fault; (2) promotion of realistic settlement potential; (3) preven-
tion of additional litigation; (4) removal of the economic burden unfairly im-
posed on solvent defendants; (5) limitation of the insurer role imposed upon
certain classes of defendants; and (6) consistency with jury determinations,
thereby avoiding an invasion of the jury function.
Arguably, a detriment of such abolition is that it potentially limits the
amount of damages an injured person will actually receive. No policy or law
requires that an injured party invariably recover the full amount of the judg-
ment obtained. The judgment-proof debtor is well known. Moreover, the in-
jured party will receive payment for that portion of the injury caused by any
given solvent debtor.
In the context of automobile crashworthiness litigation, manufacturers
are often the target defendants even though the conduct of another party was
the primary cause of the collision. Retention of joint and several liability in
such cases forces the manufacturer to become the excess carrier for that third
party regardless of its relative fault. Such a result forces the manufacturer to
settle cases in a grossly disproportionate manner because it must pay for the
wrongful acts of parties other than itself. Frequently it will be more beneficial
to try the case than to yield to the resultant inflated settlement demands. With
the easing of the plaintiff's burden of proof,' 86 it is evident that at least nomi-
nal fault will be placed upon the manufacturer by any jury aware of its
financial condition and ability to pay. If the manufacturer is not concerned
with the payment of the debt of other parties, a fair settlement offer can be
made. Alternatively, the manufacturer can defend a case with the expectation
of limiting its damages to a sum based on nominal contribution to the injury
producing occurrence where the settlement demand is overly inflated. Defense
counsel and their clients can take solace in even those limited victories in
which the proportion of fault is realistically related to what actually tran-
spired. The victory is, however, Pyrrhic if the ultimate liability is compounded
185. Id. at 1075.
186. See supra note 50-118 and accompanying text.
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by adding the total cost of other defendants' liability. Such a result deprives
the manufacturer of the true value of its day in court and deprives the jury of
its right to determine fault by rendering that determination meaningless. The
enormous increased costs judicially passed on to the manufacturer are in turn
partially or fully passed on to the consumer. The ultimate in risk and loss
spreading is thereby attained. The price of its attainment, however, is too high.
The manufacturer should be liable for its proportionate fault and no more.
Such a policy will promote settlement, deter groundless litigation, continue to
promote automotive safety and at the same time ease the economic burden
imposed on both the manufacturer and consumer.
Various courts and commentators,1 87 as well as the Model Uniform Prod-
uct Liability Act, 88 have taken a middle ground in seeking to avoid the un-
fairness of imposing the entire loss created by the absent or insolvent defen-
dant upon either the plaintiff or the defendant. In doing so, a false distinction
is made between cases in which some degree of culpability is found as to the
plaintiff and cases in which the plaintiff is without fault.' The assertion that
a plaintiff's culpability differs from that of a defendant's because plaintiff's
actions bear only on the risk of self-injury is fallacious. An injured person's
conduct can often impose risk of harm upon others. This risk may be direct, as
in situations where his fault contributes to an automobile collision endangering
passengers, bystanders or occupants of other vehicles, or the risk may be indi-
rect as in situations where danger invites rescue, thereby endangering the
rescuer.
One commentator, Professor Pearson, favors retaining joint and several
liability to protect the non-negligent plaintiff, while abolishing it for the negli-
gent plaintiff, and has observed:
This result is consistent with the general legal attitude toward
plaintiffs who are faced with an absent or insolvent defendant; the
law does not guarantee to every plaintiff a defendant who has
neither of these characteristics. Perhaps the closest analogy to allo-
cation by shares of negligence is allocation by causation. If two
persons act independently to cause discrete and divisible increments
of harm to the plaintiff, neither person is liable for the unsatisfied
loss caused by the other; liability is several, not joint. And if a per-
son is not liable for harm caused by another, neither should be lia-
ble for harm attributable to other[s] based upon the division of the
negligence. °90
Although stating that "rules of joint and several liability ought to be
rethought,"1' Professor Pearson's rethinking fails to justify the awkward re-
sult advocated through distinguishing between negligent and non-negligent
plaintiffs.
187. E.g., Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative Fault Laws-An Analysis
of the Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REV. 343 (1980); Wade, Comparative Negligence-Its Develop-
ment in the United States and Its Present Status in Louisiana, 40 LA. L. REV. 299 (1980).
188. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 111 (1979).
189. See supra note 187.
190. Pearson, supra note 187, at 363 (footnotes omitted).
191. Id. at 371.
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It has been suggested that three alternatives are available when dealing
with the problem of the insolvent tortfeasor: (1) let the claimant bear the loss
if he is contributorily negligent; (2) let the tortfeasor bear the loss; or (3)
spread the loss among all parties at fault. 92 Professor Wade argues that the
first two alternatives are unfair and that the third is the proper solution.1 "
This is a marginally acceptable position whenever the plaintiff has contributed
to the harm because the allocation of liability is recomputed, taking his share
of culpability into account and retaining a ratio of fault to liability. In this
context, joint and several liability is abrogated. This approach, however, re-
quires that the defendant or defendants bear the entire loss caused by the
insolvent defendant whenever the plaintiff is without fault. Thus, in a signifi-
cant number of cases the actual liability of the defendant can be significantly
increased. The result is to retain joint and several liability-with the degree of
liability reapportioned among remaining tortfeasors-whenever there is a
faultless plaintiff. The principles applicable to a defendant's liability cannot in
fairness be made to depend upon the actions of the plaintiff. Such principles
are and must be viewed as independent. It is improper to impose liability to
this extent, even though a similar approach is effective when a plaintiff's negli-
gence is present.194 The fairer, though sometimes harsh, approach is to leave
this loss upon the plaintiff. As between two innocent parties, there is no legiti-
mate basis for apportioning the liability so that it falls upon defendants. The
law does not guarantee a solvent defendant. Joint and several liability is an
improper device to provide such a guarantee.
VI. ILLUSTRATED PROBLEMS OF THE REVOLUTION
The ramifications of the trends relating to strict liability, crashworthiness,
burden of proof and retention of joint and several liability in comparative neg-
ligence actions can be illustrated by a hypothetical. 95 It is hoped that observa-
tion of the injustice now prevailing will lead to greater judicial restraint or,
alternatively, corrective legislation.
The typical crashworthiness case involves a single vehicle or multi-vehicle
accident caused by the negligent action of one or more drivers. A two-vehicle
accident will be hypothesized:19"
Plaintiff (P) is driving a 1973 subcompact vehicle and is not wearing an
192. Wade, supra note 187, at 310.
193. Id.
194. In such cases, a defendant will be liable for a sum in excess of his fault. The closer that
additional amount is to the total verdict, the closer the approximation to joint and several liability.
The sharing of the loss, however, justifies the result and gives at least a modicum of protection to
all parties rather than a full measure of protection to one party. The result is not ideal, but it is
practicable.
195. The facts of several actual cases have been consolidated to create the pattern set forth
in this hypothetical. Such a pattern, however, could easily occur.
196. In a single car collision where only the driver is injured, the sole defendant will usually
be the manufacturer or another entity in the chain or distribution. Other potential defendants,
such as the state highway department, may exist. In such cases, the issues will resemble those in
which the co-defendant is the adverse driver. If a passenger is injured, the driver and manufac-
turer are the most likely defendants. Again, the issues parallel those of the adverse driver although
they can be further complicated by issues such as immunity and assumption of risk.
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available seat belt restraint system. 9" As P approaches an intersection, he
fails to notice that the traffic signal is changing to red and enters the intersec-
tion under the yellow caution light. The vehicle has a broken door latch on the
driver's side which P has not had repaired, even though his mechanic told him
that the condition of the latch was extremely dangerous.
Defendant (A) is driving a 1980 luxury sedan approximately twice the
weight of P's vehicle. A is driving sixty miles per hour in a twenty-five mile
per hour zone while under the influence of alcohol. A does not slow down as he
approaches the intersection. As a result, the luxury sedan strikes P's vehicle in
the area of the driver's side door hinges. The door opens and P is ejected.' 98 P
sues A on a theory of negligence.
Defendant (B) is the manufacturer of the 1973 subcompact vehicle oper-
ated by P. P sues B on the ground that the door latching system was defective.
The only cause of action is strict liability in tort. It is alleged that due to a
defective latch on the driver's side door, P was ejected and thereby sustained a
lumbar fracture of his spinal cord rendering him a paraplegic.
Prior to the decision in Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,' 99 and its prog-
eny,2*0 the complaint against B would have been dismissed on a motion for
summary judgment as no claim for relief could be stated. " ' P however, would
have a claim remaining against A.
Prior to the development of comparative fault, P's conduct was probably
enough to entitle B to either summary judgment or a directed verdict202 due to
P's contributory negligence in failing to have the door latch repaired. If the
case reached the jury, a finding for P against A would be possible, as the jury
could simply disregard the minimal contributory negligence of P, if any, inso-
far as A is concerned. It is likely that the same jury would return a verdict for
B, the manufacturer, due to the greater role of P's contributory negligence or
assumption of risk. A proper result could deny all recovery.
Because such results were unacceptable as a matter of social policy,
courts and various state legislatures have taken corrective action. Regrettably,
the actions were often uncorrelated and have produced an inequitable solution.
To take into account more of the changes made within the last few decades
several additional assumptions are needed:
P is found to have been five percent at fault in causing the initial colli-
sion; A is found to have been ninety percent at fault in causing the initial
collision and resultant injuries; and B is found to have been five percent at
fault in causing the injuries. P is awarded a total present value sum for all
injuries of $2.5 million. 03 A pure comparative negligence statute is in ef-
197. In a growing number of jurisdictions the plaintiff's failure to wear an available seat belt
is admissible. See Werber, supra note 104, at 246-73.
198. The dynamics and kinematics of a similar, though less severe, accident are discussed in
Werber, supra note 104, at 226-31.
199. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
200. See cases cited supra notes 3, 15 & 16.
201. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56 and similar state rules; Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359
F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
202. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a) and similar state rules.
203. The actual figures would be more complex and give rise to even greater disparities in
ultimate results as the jury would have to determine the portion of injuries which were caused by
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fect.20 4 Under a crashworthiness theory, P can reach the jury on the issue of
door latch failure. If the most liberal burden of proof standards are applied,
his prima facie case can consist of: (1) use of the vehicle; (2) ejection; (3)
injury proximately caused by ejection; and (4) the door latch design was
unchanged.
The proofs under (3) and (4) will be the most difficult to establish, yet,
both can be readily accomplished. P's treating physician will most likely be
qualified to express the opinion that the lumbar fracture occurred outside the
vehicle, as a considerable number of studies suggest that this is the most likely
place for a spinal cord injury to occur. 05 P can personally testify to the fact
that the door latch was not modified in any way. An argument can be made
that the latch was broken due to the faulty design should such evidence be
required.
B will be required to etablish that the door latch design was reasonably
safe or not unreasonably dangerous. The burden of establishing a non-defect
will rest entirely upon B, whereas P will be permitted to make a prima facie
showing of defect by inference. In jurisdictions which do not permit proof of
contributory negligence in strict liability actions, P's failure to repair the latch
will be admissible only on the difficult issue of assumption of risk. If the court
accepts the proposition that P's failure constituted only general negligence, his
failure to repair despite warning may be totally precluded as to its effect upon
B's liability. This will give the jury the difficult task of applying this evidence
only in regard to the action against A. A verdict against both defendants is
possible or even likely.
P's case will reach the jury, who will be asked to consider, as to B: (1)
whether the door latch design was defective-unreasonably dangerous; (2) if so,
whether that defect was a proximate cause of injury; and (3) whether the
failure to have the door latch repaired was a foreseeable misuse. The question
as to the unchanged design may be decided as a matter of law or fact, and the
jury may be permitted to find a defect through inference premised on the facts
of the accident.
In other jurisdictions, P's burden of proof will be more extensive, and
expert testimony will be required to establish a manufacturing or design defect
which was proximately related to the ejection and which existed at the time
the subject vehicle was manufactured and sold. This modicum of proof is
the defective door latch and apportion this cost separately. The possibilities for inconsistent special
verdicts are considerably enhanced in such a case. See Caizzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 468 F.
Supp. 593 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), affid in part, rev'd in part, 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981). The court
observed the inconsistency within the jury's verdict and stated: "We need not rule on the trial
court's valiant attempt to rationalize these inconsistencies in the jury verdict (which it acknowl-
edged was 'inscrutable'), since we are granting a new trial on other grounds." Id. at 249.
204. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
205. Ejection has consistently been noted as a primary injury source with the situs of the
injury frequently the head or spinal column. See generally Gross, Accidental Motorist Ejection
and Door Latching Systems, Paper No. 817A, Society of Automotive Engineers (Jan. 1964);
Huelke & Sherman, Automobile Occupant Ejection Through the Side Door Glass, Paper No.
710076, Society of Automotive Engineers (Jan. 1971); Moore & Tourin, A Study of Automobile
Doors Opening Under Crash Conditions, AUTOMOBILE CRASH INJURY RESEARCH (1954). Cf.
Burke, Spinal Cord Injuries and Seat Belts, 2 MED. J. AUSTRALIA 801 (1973).
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clearly more responsive to the needs of justice than permitting a jury to infer
the existence of a defect, ignore rebuttal evidence, and thereby render what it
believes to be a nominal (five percent, $125,000) judgment against B, the
manufacturer. The jury would not know and could not be told that the
$125,000 could become $2,375,000 if A is judgment proof.
If there are two solvent defendants, P will simply recover ninety percent
of the $2.5 million from A and the balance, five percent, from B. Thus P
recovers $2,250,000 and $125,000 respectively. The remaining $125,000 is not
recoverable as it is attributable to P's own conduct. This result is consistent
with the equitable principles of comparative negligence and places primary
responsibility for the harm upon the primary tortfeasor.
If A is only partially insured and lacks personal assets, P can actually
recover only the insurance proceeds. A somewhat above average liability policy
will provide for $300,000 liability coverage. In this situation P, a paraplegic,
will recover a total of $425,000 if principles of joint and several liability are
not applied. This sum may be inadequate to compensate for the injuries sus-
tained. Nevertheless, a proper interpretation of both law and policy requires
this result once the concept of automatic full compensation is rightfully re-
jected. In numerous cases a plaintiff is denied virtually all recovery due to the
solvency, or lack thereof, of the only defendant available to him. In this case,
P at least recovers a significant amount.
If joint and several liability concepts are applied, B, the manufacturer,
may be required to provide P with the unpaid portion of the judgment against
A. B is now obligated to pay $2,075,000-eighty-three percent of the loss
though found to be only five percent at fault. P, who is equally culpable, has,
in effect, been required to pay only $125,000. Looked at in this perspective, P
has paid five percent of the loss he sustained; A, though ninety percent at
fault, has paid for twelve percent of the loss sustained; and B has paid approx-
imately eighty-three percent of the loss sustained. This result, in which B pays
an additional $1,950,000 is intolerable, unfair and diametrically opposed to
the equitable principles of comparative fault. It is, nonetheless, a likely result.
It must also be observed that in some jurisdictions the comparative fault
of P will not be considered in a strict liability action. This would result in a
potential increase of $125,000 in the amount to be paid by B.
Under a modified comparative fault statute,210 P may be unable to re-
cover against the adverse driver. In a state such as Ohio, if P was found to be
fifty-one percent negligent, he could not recover against the driver on his negli-
gence action, but could recover against B on the strict liability theory.20
Under Ohio law this would be a limited recovery of five percent or $125,000
as joint and several liability is abolished in comparative fault cases. The para-
dox is evident-the primary tortfeasor, A, is totally free of liability, and the
minimal tortfeasor, B, is required to pay according to its relative fault.
206. See supra text accompanying note 89.
207. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(B) (Page Supp. 1981), applies only to actions in
negligence in which defendant has asserted contributory negligence. An action in strict liability, as
against defendant B, is outside the scope of the statute as Ohio does not permit the defense of
contributory negligence in strict liability actions. See Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67
Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364
N.E.2d 267 (1977).
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No attempt has been made in the above examples to fully explore all of
the presumptions and computations of the abuses the current system promotes
and the excessive liability that it fosters. Rather, the above illustrations pro-
vide a modicum of understanding of the pervasiveness and scope of the prob-
lem. In the next section some legislation will be reviewed and suggestions of-
fered as to how the best result-consistent with fairness to all parties-can be
attained.
VII. LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES
Meaningful legislation bearing upon a manufacturer's obligations and lia-
bility falls into three primary categories: (1) product safety regulation at both
federal and state levels-in the automotive field the primary legislation is na-
tional,208 and has resulted in the passage of numerous and thorough Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;209 (2) comparative negligence or compara-
tive fault statutes at the state level; 210 and (3) product liability reform acts
which have been adopted by a significant number of states.2 11
Specific changes in current laws in each of these categories would benefit
all parties and meet the expectation of fairness of the American judicial and
legislative systems. In view of the broad scope of existing federal legislation
and the minimal likelihood of further congressional action, the suggestions
made below are directed toward state action. Nothing, however, precludes
similar national legislation.212
208. See, e.g., Traffic and Motor Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1431 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 1392 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 49 C.F.R. § 571 (1981).
210. See supra notes 119-44 and accompanying text.
211. See generally collation of product liability statutes in PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 1
90,000 (Oct. 1981).
212. The author's pessimistic view of the likelihood of federal action may be exaggerated.
Serious congressional efforts are presently taking place. A consumer subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Technology has announced the release of a Second Staff
Draft of a bill that would create uniform product liability law throughout the United States. S.
REP. 153, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (Mar. 1, 1982). The release quotes Senator Kasten in regard to
the need for such legislation: "'[Federal legislation is needed to bring uniformity and certainty to
the law and to stabilize what has become a serious burden on interstate commerce.'" Id. (remarks
of Sen. Kasten).
Of major significance in the proposed Product Liability Act are several provisions which re-
flect this acute need. Among the most important provisions is one that provides for the federal law
to supersede state law to the extent that the Act addresses an issue regardless of the underlying
compensation theory applicable in any state. S. REP. 153, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., § 3(c) (Mar. 1,
1982) (Staff Working Draft No. 2). Other important provisions provide the parameters of manu-
facturer liability in regard to "unreasonably unsafe" products and limit the liability of non-manu-
facturer sellers (id. §§ 4 & 5); create presumptions of safety or nonsafety contingent upon compli-
ance with applicable federal regulations (id. § 6); establish a concept of "comparative
responsibility" to reduce compensatory damages in accord with a claimant's responsibility for the
harm (id. § 7); address questions of misuse and alteration as impacting upon damages (id. § 8);
provide for a two-year statute of limitations and 25-year statute of repose for capital goods unless
specific exceptions apply (id. § 10); and permit punitive damages only when compensatory dam-
ages are awarded and there is clear and convincing evidence that the harm suffered resulted from
a "reckless disregard" for the safety of product users. Id. § 11.
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A. Present Legislative Alternatives
A digression is required before addressing legislative responses to the va-
rious problems raised. At this time, there are many statutory provisions and
suggestions for reform dealing with subjects which are not previously discussed
in this Article. The following provisions and suggestions are directed toward
clarifying the legal morass created by the judiciary, establishing new legal
standards and possibly seeking to restrain some of the more revolutionary ac-
tions of the courts.
1. Statutes of Repose
Statutes of repose can place a proper limit on the time during which a
product can provide a basis for a cause of action predicated on injury arising
from the use of that product. The usual approach simply bars actions, or cre-
ates presumptions of non-defect, after a specified number of years have
elapsed since the product was manufactured or sold. Many states have
adopted such statutes. 13
Without such provisions, manufacturers of high quality durable products
are penalized. A motor vehicle consigned to the junk heap five years after it
was originally sold is far less likely to be involved in an injury causing occur-
rence than a vehicle designed and built to function for ten or more years. The
potential penalty is exacerbated if the subsequent action is predicated on hind-
sight theories of liability and evidence of current technological standards. This
penalty is obviated by use of reasonable statutes of repose. Such statutes aid in
making it possible to try cases with the physical evidence still intact, including
the defendant's records, and with the testimonial evidence relatively fresh in
the minds of witnesses rather than blurred by the passage of time. Finally, a
statute of repose will permit persons or businesses to order their business af-
fairs and to plan them with a reasonable degree of certainty.
On the other hand, such statutes may not adequately take into account
the fact that some product-related injuries are not discoverable at the time of
harm.214 It also appears that such statutes are subject to constitutional at-
tack.2 1 5 Despite these drawbacks, good drafting can result in a balanced stat-
213. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577(a)
(West Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(2) (Supp. 1982); IND. CODE § 34-4-20A-5 (1978);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224 (Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (Supp. 1981); OR. REV.
STAT. § 30.905(l) (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977).
214. An illness can develop through long term exposure to dangerous substances. In some
situations, the symptoms may be masked or may not appear for a substantial number of years
after exposure. Commercial artists and art hobbyists have suffered a variety of respiratory and
other illnesses which have frequently been misdiagnosed in light of emerging evidence relating
such illnesses to exposure to chemicals contained in paint pigments. See generally M. MCCANN,
ARTIST BEWARE (1979).
215. The Florida statute of repose was declared unconstitutional in Battilla v. Allis Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980). A Florida federal court reached the same conclusion in
Ellison v. Northwest Eng'g Co., 521 F. Supp. 199, 9 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 753
(S.D. Fla., Aug. 13, 1981). See also Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 51 Law Week 2071
(Ala. 1982) (statute of repose held unconstitutional based on due process). Contra Thornton v.
Mono Mfg. Co., 99 Ill. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522 (1981) (statute of repose upheld against
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ute of repose immune from constitutional attack. Such statutes should be re-
tained where they are currently in effect and should be widely adopted.
Statutes of repose should apply to all product actions regardless of underlying
theory.
2. Useful Life Legislation
Another effective means to limit the time in which a product can give rise
to a cause of action is embodied in the concept of useful safe life or useful life.
Such provisions can apply only to products of a largely mechanical and dura-
ble nature as distinct from those which are literally used up in a short period
of time. A useful safe life statute is an excellent liability limitation means for
products such as farm and industrial machinery, automobiles and aircraft,
household tools and other similar products. These statutes recognize that any
product will eventually reach a point at which it is not safe and should be
removed from circulation. In essence, this is a recognition that even the best
technology cannot produce a product that can be safely used indefinitely. A
small number of states are in the vanguard of what may and should become a
trend toward useful safe life legislation. 16
3. Built-in Safety Devices
With increased awareness of the need for safety, manufacturers are pro-
ducing a variety of products with built-in safety devices. Occasionally such
devices require an affirmative step by the user to activate the safety feature. A
well known example is the automobile seat belt. When a user's actions do not
cause the injury causing occurrence, but do contribute to the seriousness of the
injury sustained, a problem is presented. Courts have shown considerable re-
luctance to permit such evidence into the record even if limited to the issue to
mitigation of damages. It is essential that such evidence be admitted, and it
now appears that a trend in this direction is emerging, even though such a
result is traditionally viewed as being outside the parameters of available de-
fenses.217 A legislative response could readily resolve the issue by permitting
such evidence on the issue of mitigation of damages. Such a step would pro-
mote an equitable sharing of the loss occasioned by injury and would en-
courage the use of safety devices. Such use could, for example, dramatically
reduce the number of serious injuries and deaths arising from automobile
collisions.' 16
claim that it violated due process).
216. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(a) (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. Prod. Liab. Law, as
added by 1981 Kan. Sess. Laws S.B. 185, § 3, PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 11 91,713 (May 1982);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.03 (West Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060 (West
Supp. 1982), PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) $ 94,924 (May 1982).
217. See Nash v. Kamrath, 21 Ariz. App. 530, 521 P.2d 161 (1974); Roberts v. Bohn, 26
Ohio App. 2d 50, 269 N.E.2d 53 (1971). See generally Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 1428 (1967); Kleist,
The Seat Belt Defense: An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 HASTINGS LiJ. 613 (1967).
218. If even 70% of front seat vehicle occupants used seat belts, 10,000 lives could be saved
annually. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., SECRETARY'S DECISION CONCERNING MOTOR VEHICLE OCCU-
PANT CRASH PROTECTION 29 (1976). Numerous studies have suggested and proven that increased
seat belt use would save thousands of lives and prevent tens of thousands of serious injuries every
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4. Punitive Damages
The topic of punitive damages has been widely publicized since the deci-
sion in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.2" This decision may represent one of the
rare examples of a product liability action in which punitive damages should
have been available. Strong arguments against the imposition of punitive dam-
ages in product liability litigation220 are not negated by the Grimshaw decision
or facts. It is evident that juries can overreact and impose unrealistic punitive
damages. Numerous courts, including the Grimshaw court, have reduced or
set aside punitive damage awards.' 2' Perhaps the best argument against impo-
sition of punitive damages is found in the fact that a recent decision upheld
such an award even though the product complied with applicable government
safety standards.2 21
Assuming that punitive damages are proper in product liability litiga-
tion-a dubious assumption-steps must be taken to limit the subsequent po-
tential for economic catastrophe. Various methods of dealing with punitive
damages, short of complete abolition, are now in effect. For example, an Ore-
gon statute provides that the evidence to support an award of punitive dam-
ages must be clear and convincing.2 s This higher standard of proof, as com-
pared to the normal preponderance standard, would reduce the number of
punitive damage awards while permitting awards in cases of truly egregious
behavior meriting punishment. The same statute provides that no evidence of
the defendant's ability to pay is admissible until a prima facie case for imposi-
tion of punitive damages has been established. This is a sagacious provision as
it will limit any tendency to increase compensatory damages on the improper
basis of financial capacity. A different approach has been taken in Connecti-
year. See authorities collected in Werber, supra note 104, at 222-25.
219. No. 19-77-61 (Calif. Super. Ct., filed Feb. 6) modified, 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 348 (1981).
220. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merril, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1967). Punitive
damages are not permitted in actions brought pursuant to U.C.C. § 1-106(l) (1978), except when
specifically allowed by the Code or through other applicable law. See generally DEFENSE RE-
SEARCH INST., THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES (1969); Carsey, The Case Against Puni-
tive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative Outline, I I FORUM 57 (1975); Haskell, The Aircraft
Manufacturer's Liability for Design and Punitive Damages-The Insurance Policy and Public
Policy, 40 J. AIR L. & COM. 595 (1974); Hoenig, supra note 113, at 254-55.
221. Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 964-66 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (overturned a
$10 million award); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 48-49 (Alaska 1979) (reduction
from $2.9 million to $250,000); Sabich v. Outboard Marine Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 591, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 703 (1976) (reversing a $1.25 million award); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App.
3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (reduction from $125 million to $3.5 million).
Despite this willingness to limit such damages in a single action, courts have been unable to
preclude awards of punitive damages seriatim. A defendant is often compelled to pay punitive
damages for the same defect or tort in actions pending before courts in many jurisdictions. Princi-
ples of collateral estoppel and of an equivalent to double jeopardy have been inapplicable. This
Article does not treat this issue and proposes no legislative response although such a response is
perhaps the only means to resolve the problem in a manner consistent with the stated policies and
objectives of punitive damages. For a recent case which awarded punitive damages, see generally
Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 51 U.S.L.W. 2289 (6th Cir. Oct. 26, 1982).
222. See Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1981).
223. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925(1) (1979).
19821
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
cut, where punitive damages are awarded by the court after a jury determina-
tion that such an award should be made.12 4 The court's award cannot exceed a
sum equal to twice the compensatory damages awarded.
2 2 5
B. Proposals for Reform Legislation
1. Crashworthiness-Design Defect Litigation
Design defect litigation is unquestionably the most complex form of prod-
uct liability litigation. A design engineer is required to consider and balance a
multitude of factors including safety to economy as well as form through func-
tion. In determining the existence of an alleged design defect the question be-
comes: How much design safety is enough? The response to this question can
be found only in the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conscious design
choice. This standard is the core of negligence theory. Its application to design
defect cases would permit the fact finder to consider all relevant factors which
governed the final design selected as well as the factors which led to the injury
producing occurrence regardless of their source. Application of a negligence
standard would permit recovery based on fault without detrimentally affecting
the public policy rationales of risk spreading or deterrence. Utilization of a
negligence standard would also promote the principles of comparative fault
without necessitating the redrafting or reinterpreting of existing comparative
fault statutes. Only a negligence theory provides all of these benefits without
the detriments inherent in warranty or strict liability theory. This is the sole
theory readily understood by jurors and which avoids the most difficult
problems created by the polycentricity of design defect litigation. A statutory
model could be premised upon the following:
In any product liability action in which the claimant seeks re-
covery for damages arising from a design defect which either, (1)
caused the injury producing occurrence, or (2) enhanced the inju-
ries sustained due to such occurrence, the claimant must prove that
the defect in the design proximately caused the injuries complained
of and that the design defect was the direct result of one or more
negligent acts of the manufacturer.
In the automotive field, the NHTSA has promulgated extensive safety
standards. These Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards are continuously
reviewed and provide a meaningful standard of care. The cost of compliance
with these mandatory standards is high and should be accorded value to the
manufacturer as well as to the consumer. The standards govern safety glass,
door strength and latch design, fuel system integrity, occupant protection and
numerous other areas. They also prescribe test compliance procedures. More-
224. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225 (West 1958).
225. Additionally, various legislative approaches to questions of the relationship of retailers
to manufacturers and consumers are emerging. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-684 (Supp.
1982); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.340 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2
(1979). Such efforts are well taken and should be encouraged. See also Note, Mass Liability and
Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1797 (1979) for an interesting solution to the prob-
lem of multiple punitive damages awards arising from separate actions brought by more than one
injured party. This complex problem will be explored by this author in a forthcoming article.
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over, the standards balance energy and air pollution requirements, cost factors
and feasibility, and the effects upon other vehicles in accident circumstances.
Thus, the standards reflect a solution to the interrelated problems of overall
design.226 Mere opinion evidence provided by a retained expert witness who is
focusing on a single design element should not be permitted to overcome the
meticulous, broad and careful considerations which are the foundation of the
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.2 7 A statutory model could be pre-
mised upon the following:
Compliance by a manufacturer of a motor vehicle with any
federal motor vehicle safety standard existing at the time of manu-
facture, or enacted subsequent to such manufacture, in regard to
design, inspection, testing, or manufacture of the vehicle is conclu-
sive evidence that the vehicle is not defective or unreasonably dan-
gerous and was not negligently designed, provided that the stan-
dard complied with is directly related to the defect in design
alleged to be the proximate cause of the claimant's injury or the
occurrence which led to such injury.
2. Strict Liability-A Unified Cause of Action
The most practical resolution of the problems arising from application of
strict liability in product liability actions would be to simply abolish the doc-
trine. Such a result is unattainable and, even if possible, perhaps unwise. With
the exception of design defect litigation, however, strict liability can be useful
in product liability litigation and is a recognized means to achieve accepted
public policy goals. Rather than permit an action to proceed on alternative
theories of liability with the resultant complexities relating to admissibility of
evidence and jury charges,2 " a unified cause of action premised upon strict
226. Such functional variables could not possibly be considered adequately in the trial
of a specific crash design case, and no court or jury could ever adequately scrutinize
all the relevant design considerations. The jury would simply focus upon the injuries
sustained in the case, and claimant's counsel would only invite the jury to consider
that this particular car should have been "built up" and made stronger. The effect
upon the other occupants of other vehicles in other accidents would be minimized.
Only legislatures and administrative agencies are equipped to properly weigh these
interrelated problems.
Hoenig, supra note 113, at 247.
227. 15 U.S.C. § 1392 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 49 C.F.R. § 571 (1981). At least one court
was fully aware of this when considering expert testimony which contradicted a drug approval
made by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Although unwilling to make the FDA ap-
proval conclusive, the court stated:
[Ilts [FDA] determinations, based upon the opinions and judgment of its own ex-
perts, should not be subject to challenge in a product liability case simply because
some other experts may differ in their opinions as to whether a particular drug is
reasonably safe, unless there is some proof of fraud or nondisclosure of relevant
information by the manufacturer at the time of obtaining or retaining such federal
approval.
McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 196 Neb. 190, 200, 241 N.W.2d 822, 828 (1976).
228. For example, proof of contributory negligence would be admissible in regard to the
negligence claim and could be a defense to that claim. The same facts would not be admissible as
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liability is appropriate. Restriction to a single claim for relief will simplify and
shorten trials, ease evidentiary burdens, and allow for comprehensible jury in-
structions. A unified approach, suggested by many commentators, is part of
the law in several jurisdictions and is codified in the Model Uniform Product
Liability Act. 2
Provided that strict liability retains distinct obligations of proof to estab-
lish the existence of a defect and that that defect made the product unreasona-
bly dangerous and, further, that contributory negligence be permitted as a de-
fense in mitigation of damages or as part of a comparative fault program, the
doctrine can be the basis of a unified cause of action. This cause of action
could apply to all product liability actions except those involving design defect
allegations. A statutory model could be premised upon the following:
(1) A product liability action shall include all actions brought
for or on account of personal injury, death or property damage
caused by or resulting from the manufacture, construction, assem-
bly, testing, service, warning, instruction, marketing, packaging, or
labeling of any product.
(2) In any product liability action the burden of proof is upon
the claimant to establish that the product was:'
a. defective, and
b. unreasonably dangerous.
(3) The claimant must also establish that the defective and
unreasonably dangerous condition complained of was the proximate
cause of the injury producing occurrence for which relief is sought.
(4) All common law defenses, including contributory negli-
gence, are available in a product liability action. Such defenses are
not absolute, but are to be applied by the fact finder in accordance
with [reference to comparative fault statute].
(5) The provisions of this section do not apply to any product
liability action premised upon any allegation of design defect. Such
actions are governed by [reference to design defect statute].'3
3. Definitions and Burden of Proof
The difficulties presented by judicial efforts to define defect and unreason-
a defense to a strict liability claim under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n
(1965). A jury would have to be instructed to disregard the claimant's behavior as to strict liabil-
ity, but to consider it in regard to negligence and contributory negligence.
229. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT § 102(D) (1979). The Act provides for a
single "product liability claim" combining the elements of all recognized theories of liability. The
analysis of the section advises: "An important purpose of this Act is to consolidate product liabil-
ity actions that have, at times, been separated . . . [and) product liability theory and practice
have merged into a single entity and can only be stabilized if there is one, not a multiplicity of,
causes of action." Id.
230. Part (I) is modeled on ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2802(e) (Supp. 1981), with some dele-
tions. Part (2) contains the substantive elements of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965). Part (4) is designed to exclude the effect of comment n of section 402A. See supra note
92. Part (5) is provided to permit consistency with a negligence based cause of action for design
defect litigation.
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ably dangerous product have been detailed at length and require no further
amplification. 3 1 The best and most practical definition of defect must depend
upon risk utility analysis. To be fair to all parties this definition must preclude
any reference to a hindsight standard, i.e., whether a prudent manufacturer
would have produced the product had knowledge of the occurrence or injury
been available at the time of manufacture. The consumer expectancy test is
consistent with a risk utility analysis definition of defect and this standard is
generally accepted for purposes of determining whether a product is unreason-
ably dangerous.
Directly related to questions of definition is the role of state of the art
standards and compliance with governmental regulation . 23 A proper role for
such factors is a necessary complement to any definition of defect or unreason-
ably dangerous product. Unless a viable defense can be predicated upon such
factors, a strict liability standard of liability would prove overly unfair to de-
fendant manufacturers and would escalate the product liability crisis which
currently prevails. A manufacturer whose product meets or exceeds state of
the art standards or complies with applicable government regulations should
receive the benefit of a presumption that its product is not defective or unrea-
sonably dangerous. This presumption should not be rebutted absent clear and
convincing evidence to establish the existence of a defect and unreasonably
dangerous condition despite compliance. The burden of proof to show compli-
ance must rest with the manufacturer and the burden of rebuttal must rest
with the claimant. Only a clear and convincing standard for the rebuttal will
assure that the rebuttal evidence will be of sufficiently high quality as to per-
mit a fact question to arise. Statutory models could be premised on the
following:
Defective Product
A product is defective if it:
(1) Fails to meet the design specifications governing its manu-
facture; or
(2) Fails to comply with any applicable state of the art stan-
dard or regulation of this state or the United States in effect at the
time of manufacture; or
(3) The fact finder determines that the product should not
have been marketed as manufactured after considering and balanc-
ing each of the following elements:
a. the utility of the product to the claimant and the pub-
lic as a whole;
b. the reasonably foreseeable likelihood that the product
would cause injury and the probable seriousness of that
injury;
c. the availability of a substitute product which would
meet the same need and not be unsafe without an undue in-
crease in cost;
d. the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe
231. See supra note 50-81 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 99-118 and accompanying text.
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character of the product without impairing its usefulness or
making it too expensive to maintain its utility;
e. the ability of a reasonably prudent user to avoid the
danger by exercising care in the use of the product;
f. the reasonably prudent user's anticipated awareness of
the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, be-
cause of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of
the product, or the existence of suitable instructions or warn-
ings which are reasonably calculated to provide the informa-
tion necessary to understand and appreciate the risk of use." '
(4) No inference of defect may be drawn from the fact that an
injury occurred during a proper use or reasonably forseeable mis-
use of the product.
Unreasonably Dangerous Product
An unreasonably dangerous product is a product that is dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordi-
nary and reasonable buyer, consumer, or user who acquires or uses
such product, assuming the ordinary knowledge of the community,
or of similar buyers, users or consumers, as to its characteristics,
propensities, risks, dangers, proper and improper uses, as well as
any special knowledge, training or experience possessed by the par-
ticular buyer, user or consumer or special knowledge which he or
she was required to possess. However, as to a minor, "unreasonably
dangerous" means that a product is dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by an ordinary and reasonably
careful minor considering his age and intelligence.23
State of the Art-Government Regulation
(1) In any product liability action it shall be rebuttably pre-
sumed that the product which caused the injury, death, or property
damage was not defective and that the manufacturer or seller
thereof was not negligent if the product:
a. prior to sale by the manufacturer, conformed to the
state of the art or industry standards applicable to such prod-
uct in existence at the time of the sale; or
b. complied with, at the time of sale by the manufac-
turer, any applicable code, standard, or regulation adopted or
promulgated by the United States or by this state, or by any
agency of the United States or of this state.
(2) In like manner, noncompliance with any government code,
standard, or regulation existing and in effect at the time of sale of
233. The six elements are premised upon the considerations proposed by Wade, On the Na-
ture of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973). Substantive changes
have been made in places and the seventh element suggested by Wade, loss spreading capacity,
has been omitted.
234. The definition is taken from ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2802(g) (Supp. 1981) (effective
1979). The distinction between adults and minors is appropriate for a definition of unreasonably
dangerous. Note, however, that the consumer expectancy test adopted by North Dakota does not
make the distinction. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-05(2) (Supp. 1981) (effective 1979).
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the product by the manufacturer which contributed to the claim or
injury shall create a rebuttable presumption that the product was
defective or negligently manufactured. 3 5
(3) The rebuttable presumptions specified in sections (1) a.
and (1) b. may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.
If the party bearing the burden of proof to rebut fails to submit
admissible evidence of sufficiently high quality to meet this stan-
dard, the court shall order an appropriate directed verdict.
(4) Evidence of advancement or changes in the state of art or
industry standards made subsequent to the time the product was
first sold by any defendant is not admissible to prove any issue re-
lated to liability.
(5) Evidence of any applicable code, standard or regulation
adopted or promulgated by the United States or by this state, or by
any agency of the United States or this state subsequent to the
time the product was first sold by any defendant, is not admissible
for any purpose except to establish that the product complied with
such subsequent code, standard or regulation) 6
(6) The provisions above notwithstanding, evidence of compli-
ance with any federal motor vehicle safety standard, in accordance
with section - of this Act, shall be conclusive proof that the mo-
tor vehicle is not defective or unreasonably dangerous and was not
negligently designed.
4. Apportionment of Liability
As discussed above 2 37 the primary problems in present apportionment
systems revolve around (1) the failure of some courts to apply comparative
negligence statutes to product liability actions which are not founded on negli-
gence principles; and (2) retention of joint and several liability.
Comparative fault principles have unique benefits in product liability ac-
tions.3 8 Because such actions can be distinguished from more traditional neg-
ligence actions, it is possible to provide for comparative fault in product liabil-
ity actions even if the legislature does not believe such a step to be generally
appropriate. Various versions of comparative fault statutes have previously
been cited." 9 Some states have enacted comparative fault statutes specifically
directed toward product liability actions.2 40 Alternatively, rather than using
235. Parts (1) and (2) are modeled on COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403 (Supp. 1981). A
substantive change has been made in that the proposal includes industry standards whereas the
Colorado statute excludes such standards.
236. Parts (4) and (5) are partially based upon and adopt language from: ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 34-2804 & 34-2085 (Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403 (Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. 600.2946(3) (West Supp. 1981). Note, however, that the proposed provisions are
significantly different from any of the sample statutes proposed.
237. See supra notes 118-94 and accompanying text.
238. For example, in a crashworthiness action when defendant A is an adverse driver and
defendant B is the manufacturer of the claimant's motor vehicle.
239. Supra notes 146-49.
240. E.g-, -COLoM.REV. STAT. § 13-21-406 (Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. AN §
52.572(o) (West 1979).
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such a specific approach, a legislature could rely on any existing statute which
is broad enough to encompass product liability actions regardless of underlying
theory. 4
As indicated earlier, some states have abolished joint and several liability
in comparative negligence situations. 42 Despite legislation to this effect in
some states and some judicial determinations, it does not appear that a
marked trend toward abolishing joint and several liability presently exists. The
belief that an injured claimant is entitled to a substantial recovery is simply
too well entrenched to permit total abolition of joint and several liability on a
broad scale. An alternative to complete abolition must, therefore, be consid-
ered. The conduct of the claimant is an arbitrary and unfair basis for appor-
tionment because claimant's actions have already been considered and would,
therefore, be accorded disproportionate emphasis. Despite assertions that a
system predicated on the conduct of the plaintiff can serve to limit the more
onerous burdens imposed by joint and several liability, such a system is inher-
ently unfair and arbitrary in application. Accordingly, some other means to
limit ultimate liability must be established.
An alternative which will increase the amount of recovery by a claimant
yet limit the amount to be paid by any single defendant is available. A com-
promise can be reached through which the injured party will be partially pro-
tected against the uncollectible defendant, but which will often keep this gain
within acceptable levels. The punitive damage approach of Connecticut 2 43 can
be used to limit defendants' responsibility under joint and several liability.
Such a provision would be adequate in most product liability actions. It is
inadequate, however, where the nature of the fault attributed to various defen-
dants is disparate. The most prevalent of such situations is the crashworthiness
action. In this area, it is unfair to add any additional liability to that of a
defendant whose only actual liability is premised upon enhanced injury or
whose actions would have resulted in limited injuries but for the design prob-
lem. This inequity can be avoided through specific statutory language.
Statutes to meet the goals suggested above could be premised upon the
following:
(1) In any product liability action in which more than one de-
fendant is found at fault and a defendant's proportion of fault is
Such statutes can serye as models. For example, the Colorado statute provides:
In any product liability action, the fault of the person suffering the harm, as well as
the fault of all others who are parties to the action for causing the harm, shall be
compared by the trier of fact in accordance with this section. The fault of the per-
son suffering the harm shall not bar such person, or a party bringing an action on
behalf of such a person, or his estate, or his heirs from recovering damages, but the
award of damages to such person or the party bringing the action shall be dimin-
ished in proportion to the amount of causal fault attributed to the person suffering
the harm. If any party is claiming damages for a decedent's wrongful death, the
fault of the decedent, if any, shall be imputed to such party.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-406(1) (Supp. 1981).
241. E.g.. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1764 & 27-1765 (Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. 8 604.01
(Supp. 1981).
242. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 146, at § 16.4.
243. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240(b) (West 1979).
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determined by the jury, that defendant's total liability cannot ex-
ceed an amount equal to twice the value of its proportionate fault.
(2) Where a claim for relief is directed against multiple defen-
dants in an action premised upon a product liability claim as to one
or more defendants and a different claim against one or more other
defendants, joint and several liability, as limited by part (1) of this
section, is available only as between members of each group of de-
fendants. No additional liability may be imposed upon the product
defendants for that portion of the harm attributable to the non-
product defendants.
CONCLUSION
This Article illustrates that the product liability revolution has caused dis-
turbing modifications in both procedural and substantive law. These changes
have contributed to the crisis now facing all parties within the chain of prod-
uct manufacture and distribution. Left unrestrained, the ramifications of judi-
cial action upon both business and consumer will remain unacceptable. With-
out meaningful limitation, decisions now perceived as aberrational will become
the norm for imposition of absolute liability.
The proposals for legislative reform can become the basis for discussion
and ultimate decision making. If states adopt legislation premised along the
lines suggested, protection will be afforded to product defendants while pre-
serving the consumer's right to recover for harm caused by improper actions of
such defendants. At the same time, such legislation would prevent any further
judicial imposition of insurer liability upon product manufacturers, most nota-
bly automobile manufacturers. Adoption of legislation premised upon the prof-
fered proposals will also assist product sellers and manufacturers to plan their
affairs. Perhaps the most important result of such legislation, however, is that
manufacturers would be encouraged to focus their technological and financial
resources upon product safety rather than product litigation.
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